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ABSTRACT
The European Union's policies towards the states on its new, post-2004 enlargement, external borders (the European 
Neighbourhood Policy, but also the Cotonou project) present two complementary yet competing tendencies: the establishment 
of Pax Mercatoria (the model historically developed in and by the EC itself, wherein international political stability is 
facilitated by economic interdependence) - on the one hand, and the pursuit of Pax Europea (the establishment of a European 
zone of superior international economic, political and legal influence), on the other. The balance between these will ultimately 
be struck by the cumulative economic, political and social effects of the new legal arrangements that will be reached. This 
paper focuses on one detailed aspect of the EU's external relations that may affect this balance, the role of trade dispute 
resolution provisions in the European Community's Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs), in particular their 'juridical interface' 
with the dispute settlement system of the World Trade Organization (WTO), in the context of their legal, economic and 
political implications for the EC's RTA partners.  
 
Beyond providing a focused comparative overview of certain relevant elements of the dispute settlement provisions in EC 
RTAs and their regulation of choices of forum and applicable law, I argue that the dispute settlement provisions of most EC 
RTAs (and their practice) contribute to the maintenance and management of the EC's regional economic pre-eminence by 
encouraging and perpetuating non-judicialized, bilateral diplomatic dispute settlement in which the EC enjoys distinct 
advantages. This substitutes and subverts the more judicialized, rule-based dispute resolution system that is available on a 
formal basis in the WTO, and on an unutilized optional basis in most EC RTAs. In this regard, existing EC RTA dispute 
settlement does not conform to the theoretical requisites for the achievement of a regional Pax Mercatoria (which in my 
analysis include effectiveness, automaticity, and legalized juridical interface with the WTO), but is rather more designed in 
furtherance of a Pax Europea.
This is in contrast to the parallel situation in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) (as well as the EC's 'extra-
regional' RTAs with Chile and Mexico, and to lesser extent, the SACU), that although historically established for purely 
economic purposes and devoid of a political ethos, the law and practice of its dispute settlement mechanisms promote a Pax 
Mercatoria, but not a Pax Americana. This contradicts the Pax Mercatoria ethos of the EU's contemporary regional policies, is 
contrary to the EU's advocacy of the rule of law, and depicts the EU as a 'poor man's' hegemon in the shadow of the United 
States. It is therefore in the interest of the EU's own initiatives to reform the dispute settlement procedures in its regional trade 
agreements, to bring them more in line with its strategic statements, by introducing improved, judicialized dispute settlement in 
RTAs; but ultimately it is up to each partner to weigh the balance between Pax Mercatoria and the degree of Pax Europea that 
it is willing to accept in its relations with the EU.   
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From Pax Mercatoria to Pax Europea:
How Trade Dispute Procedures Serve the EC’s Regional Hegemony 
Tomer Broude*
I. Introduction 
 
Having completed the first and major wave of its 21st century enlargement,1 the European 
Union (EU) is now intent on restructuring its relations with the immediate non-European 
geopolitical surroundings. As the Commission of the European Communities (EC)2 stated in its 
March, 2003 Communication entitled Wider Europe - Neighbourhood: A New Framework for 
Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours (the Wider Europe Initiative; 
subsequently renamed the "European Neighborhood Policy" or "EPN"),3 the EU "must act to 
promote the regional and subregional cooperation and integration that are preconditions for 
political stability, economic development and the reduction of poverty and social divisions"4 in 
the environment it shares with the countries on its new external borders – Russia, the Western 
Newly Independent States (NIS) and the Southern Mediterranean. Concurrently, the EU is 
casting its net even farther afield by engaging in the implementation of the Cotonou 
Agreement5 with the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACP), in the process of 
negotiating new Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) with its ACP regional groups.  
 
These EU initiatives are not merely cloaked in benevolence: they hold significant 
potential for improving economic, political and social conditions in the partner states.6 Their 
dynamic logic is one of peace and prosperity through interdependence - the EU exporting its 
recipe for success.7 Yet at the same time, these agendas can be understood as EU bids for 
 
* Lecturer, Faculty of Law and Department of International Relations, Hebrew University of Jerusalem; BA, LLB, Hebrew 
University of Jerusalem; SJD, University of Toronto. This paper has been prepared for presentation at an international 
conference on "the European Union in Regional Conflict Resolution", on the occasion of the establishment of the Trilateral 
Center for European Studies, organized by the Israeli Association for the Study of European Integration in cooperation with 
the Friedrich Naumann Foundation, The EU-Israel Forum, The German Innovation Centre and the Interdisciplinary Centre, 
Herzliya, 24-25 October, 2004.   
1 On 1 May, 2004, the following 10 states acceded to the EU: Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. Although the candidacy of Bulgaria, Romania, Turkey and Croatia is still outstanding, 
and the future accession of Switzerland, Norway, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Macedonia and Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina is 
conceivable, the completion of the mainstay of the post-cold war enlargement project has shifted considerable European 
attention to the states surrounding the EU that are not natural candidates for accession; see European Commission, Press 
Release, "Beyond Enlargement: Commission Shifts European Neighborhood Policy into Higher Gear", PP/04/632, Brussels, 
12 May, 2004, available online: 
http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/04/632&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguag
e=en (this and all other web sources cited in this paper were last accessed on 21 October, 2004). The EU Commissioner for 
Enlargement has since 2003 also been responsible for the European Neighborhood Policy.   
2 Throughout this paper, primary reference is made to the EC, rather than the European Union (EU), because by virtue of their 
legal personality and competences, it is the EC and its Member States that are party to RTAs and the WTO. Reference to the 
EU is made mainly in political contexts.  
3 See Com(2003) 104 final, 11 March, 2003.    
4 Ibid. p. 1. 
5 See Partnership Agreement between the Members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States, of the One Part, 
and the European Community and its Member States, of the Other Part, Signed 23 June, 2000 in Cotonou, Benin, entered into 
force, 1 April, 2003, full text available online, Commission of the European Communities, 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/development/body/cotonou/agreement_en.htm.
6 For an overview of the EPN and a discussion of its limitations, see G. Harpaz, "The Obstacles and Challenges that Lie Ahead 
for a Successful Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy as a Social Engineering and Peace-Promotion 
Instrument", paper presented at an international conference on "the European Union in Regional Conflict Resolution", on the 
occasion of the establishment of the Trilateral Center for European Studies, organized by the Israeli Association for the Study 
of European Integration in cooperation with the Friedrich Naumann Foundation, The EU-Israel Forum, The German 
Innovation Centre and the Interdisciplinary Centre, Herzliya, 24-25 October, 2004.   
7 Ibid., p. 1.  
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regional influence and hegemony, employing the resources at its disposal in order to serve its 
own interests and impose its own order,8 with less sensitivity to the actual wishes of those 
whose lot it would like to improve. The balance between these complementary yet competing 
tendencies – the establishment of Pax Mercatoria (the model historically developed in and by 
the EC itself, wherein international political stability is facilitated by economic 
interdependence) - on the one hand, and the pursuit of Pax Europea (the establishment of a 
European zone of superior international economic, political and legal influence), on the other - 
will ultimately be struck by the cumulative economic, political and social effects of the new 
legal arrangements that will be reached under the ENP and Cotonou projects.    
This paper focuses on one detailed aspect of the EU's external relations that may affect 
this balance. Looking towards the redesign of the legal frameworks of the EU's regional trade 
relations, the paper discusses the role of the trade dispute resolution provisions in the Regional 
Trade Agreements (RTAs) of the EC, in particular their 'juridical interface'9 with the dispute 
settlement system of the World Trade Organization (WTO), in the context of their legal, 
economic and political implications for the EC's RTA partners. Beyond providing a focused 
comparative overview of certain relevant elements of the dispute settlement provisions in EC 
RTAs and their regulation of choices of forum and applicable law, I argue that the dispute 
settlement provisions of most EC RTAs (and their practice) contribute to the maintenance and 
management of the EC's regional10 economic pre-eminence by encouraging and perpetuating 
 
8 See Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy, G. Verheugen, as quoted in Press Release, supra 
note 1: "A ring of well-governed countries around the EU, offering new perspectives for democracy and economic growth, is 
in the interests of Europe as a whole".  
9 I adopt this term from F.M. Abbott, "The North American Integration Regime and its Implications for the World Trading 
System" in J.H.H. Weiler (ed.), The EU, WTO and NAFTA: Towards a Common Law of International Trade (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2000), 169-199 at 177. This term is flexible enough to include a broad range of legal issues arising from the 
coexistent activity of formally independent international legal systems, courts and tribunals, primarily the problem of 
competing jurisdictions (identified as including three "different temporal situations", i.e., (1) choice of forum; (2) parallel 
proceedings; and (3) successive proceedings; see Y. Shany, The Competing Jurisdictions of International Courts and 
Tribunals (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 17) but also questions related to applicable sources of law and conflicts of 
norms: the recognition of rules from competing legal systems, and the hierarchy or priority between different sources of law 
(on this, see J. Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms in Public International Law: How WTO Law Relates to Other Rules of 
International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); and J. Pauwelyn, "The Role of Public International Law in 
the WTO: How Far Can We Go?" (2001) 95 Am. J. Int. L. 535-578.     
10 The term 'regional' is used in at least two different ways in this paper and so requires some clarification. On one hand, 
following the ordinary meaning of the word, 'regional' denotes a spatial geopolitical context that is common to the EC and its 
neighbours, based primarily on geographical proximity, e.g., 'Europe'. Or the 'Euro-Mediterranean' region. On the other hand, 
however, following General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)/WTO terminology, the term 'regional' is detached from 
the strictures of geography. 'Regional Trade Agreements' (in capitals) is a catch-phrase-cum-misnomer encompassing virtually 
all sub-GATT trade agreements that derogate from the Article I GATT most-favoured-nation (MFN) principle; many of the 
RTAs in existence today are not 'regional' in the proper geographical sense – e.g., the Free Trade Agreement Between the 
Republic of Korea and the Republic of Chile, signed 15 February, 2003, entered into force, 1 April, 2004 (full text available 
online, http://www.mofat.go.kr/ko/division/fta_new_9.mof) or the Free Trade Agreement between Israel and Canada, signed 
31 July, 1996, entered into force, 1 September, 1997 (full text available online, http://www.sice.oas.org/Trade/can-isr/can-
isr.asp). Indeed, the provisions governing the establishment of RTAs and their GATT/WTO compatibility (regarding trade in 
goods) - Article XXIV GATT, Ad Article XXIV and the WTO Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXIV of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (part of the WTO Agreements incorporated in the Agreement Establishing the World 
Trade Organization, app. 1 in The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, 33 I.L.M. 1226 at 1244 et 
seq.) – do not include the term 'regional' but rather refer more generally to 'customs unions' and 'free trade areas' (the 
corresponding Article V of the General Agreement on Trade in Services uses the phrase "an agreement liberalizing trade in 
services between or among the parties to such an agreement"). The  'Enabling Clause' which is, inter alia, the basis for certain 
RTAs among developing countries (Decision on Differential and More Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity, and Fuller 
Participation of Developing Countries, GATT Document L/4903, 28 November 1979, BISD 26S/203) explicitly allows 
"regional" but also "global" arrangements (Article 2(c)). In none of these cases is regional proximity a substantive condition 
for the establishment of a preferential trade arrangement. Nevertheless, the term 'regional' has persisted for decades, and the 
relevant WTO committee has been dubbed the 'Committee on Regional Trade Agreements' (CRTA) (established by the WTO 
General Council in WTO Doc. WT/L/127, 7 February, 1996; notably, footnote 1 of this Decision, applies the CRTA's mandate 
to "all bilateral, regional, and plurilateral trade agreements of a preferential nature"). In this paper I refer to the EC's regional 
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non-judicialized, bilateral diplomatic dispute settlement in which the EC enjoys distinct 
advantages, on both tactical and strategic levels (i.e., with respect to a specific trade dispute, 
but also with regard to the ECs regional economic and political status, more generally). This 
substitutes and subverts the more judicialized, rule-based dispute resolution system that is 
available on a formal basis in the WTO,11 and on an unutilized optional basis in most EC 
RTAs. In this regard, existing EC RTA dispute settlement does not conform to the requisites 
for the achievement of a regional Pax Mercatoria, but is rather more designed in furtherance of 
a Pax Europea. This is in contrast to the parallel situation in the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA), for example, that although historically established for purely economic 
purposes and devoid of a political ethos, the law and practice of its dispute settlement 
mechanisms promote a Pax Mercatoria, but not a Pax Americana.
In developing this argument the paper is constructed as follows. The following section 
II explains and consolidates political theories of Pax Mercatoria and suggests an incorporation 
of the role of trade dispute settlement into their framework. Subsequently, section III provides 
an empirical sketch of the record of EC/RTA-partner disputes since 1995, and contrasts it with 
the parallel record of trade disputes between the United States (US) and the partners to its main 
RTA, the NAFTA – Mexico and Canada - during the same period.12 On this background, in 
section IV, I survey and categorize the dispute settlement systems of NAFTA and EC RTAs, 
with special focus on their effectiveness, automaticity and juridical interface provisions, 
evaluate them in relation to the theoretical outline of section II and associate them with the 
factual findings of section III, demonstrating the non-Pax Mercatoria character of EC RTAs in 
the EC's own regional environment. In the concluding section V I explain how the law and 
practice of most EC RTA dispute settlement mechanisms, as depicted in previous sections, not 
only stray from the Pax Mercatoria rationale, but also may serve a Pax Europea function. This 
is then discussed in the broader context of the EC's maneuvering between multilateralism and 
region-bilateralism in global trade relations, as are the limits of the EU's pursuit of political 
aims through RTA dispute settlement; finally, some advice is tendered to the EC and to states 
and groups of states currently engaged in negotiations with the EC towards the establishment 
of RTAs or the enhancement of existing ones, with respect to the design of future dispute 
settlement procedures. 
 
economic and political relations in the first sense; i shall see that there are differences between the EC's truly 'regional' RTAs 
and its 'extra-regional' RTAs. 
11 In its formal design, the legal basis for the jurisdiction of the WTO is one of 'supra-consent', requiring the consent of the 
WTO Membership as vested in the WTO Dispute Settlement Body; moreover, in practical terms, the 'negative consensus' rule 
in Article 6.1of the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) (Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 
Annex 2: Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, April 15, 1994, app. 1 in The Results 
of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, 33 I.L.M. 1226 at 1244 et seq.) means that the establishment of a 
WTO Panel is dependent upon the consent of one party only – the complainant – making WTO jurisdiction effectively 
compulsory or 'quasi-automatic'. See Pauwelyn supra note 2 at 553; and in some detail, T. Broude, International Governance 
in the World Trade Organization: Judicial Boundaries and Political Capitulation (London: Cameron May, 2004), Ch. 
VIII.A.3.  
12 The year 1995 provides a convenient starting point for analysis. It provides us with a decade of practice to analyze; it was 
the year of entry into force of the WTO agreements, not long after the entry into force of NAFTA; within a year of the entry 
into force of the first European Partnership Agreements and the year of the signing of the first Euro-Mediterranean Agreement 
(for more information on these categories of RTAs, see section IV infra).  
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II. Pax Mercatoria and Trade Dispute Settlement: A Theoretical Outline 
 
(a) Pax Mercatoria: The Academic Debate 
 
The concept of Pax Mercatoria – the proposition that the economic interdependence that 
comes with increased international trade promotes peaceful international relations – has 
pervaded liberal thinking for centuries,13 and is one of the fundamentals of Kantian peace 
theory.14 It is a central justificatory tenet of regional economic integration,15 perhaps most 
obviously embedded in the theoretical underpinnings of the project of European integration.16 
As mentioned in the introduction to this paper, it is also the declared ideological foundation of 
the European Union's extra-European regional policy, not only in the field of trade. In this 
section I explore the relevant theoretical aspects of the concept, focusing on the relationship 
between models of trade dispute settlement and the stability of international political relations. 
 
The last several decades have seen a veritable explosion of scholarship on the possible 
linkage between trade, peace and international political stability. Some research focuses on the 
empirical validity and specification of Pax Mercatoria theory,17 while other contributions 
attempt to model the relation between trade and interdependence, on one hand, and peace and 
political stability, on the other,18 and investigate the causal domestic and international 
dynamics of the relationship.19 While the basic liberal insight of "peace through trade" enjoys 
significant support, and has yet to be effectively refuted,20 it is nevertheless clear from the 
literature that we do not yet possess a firm understanding of Pax Mercatoria as a practical 
concept that is theoretically comprehensive and empirically sound.21 
13 The idea can be traced in the 17th century musings of Emeric Crucé on international peace (The New Cineas (New York: 
Garland Publishing, 1972 (original ed. 1623, Le Nouveau Cynée ou Discours d'Etat)). Well known proponents from the 18th-
19th centuries include Montesquieu (see Charles de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu, The Spirit of Laws (First ed. 1773), 
translated and edited by M. Cohler, B.C. Miller and H.S. Stone (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), Book XX, 
Chapter 2), Adam Smith, David Hume, and Richard Cobden (for a partial intellectual history, see A. Robson, "Individual 
Freedom, International Trade and International Conflict: Cobden was Right", 15 September, 2003, online: The Independent 
Institute, http://www.independent.org/students/article.asp?ID=1333).   
14 I. Kant, Perpetual Peace (New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1957 (original ed. 1795, Zum Ewigen Frieden)); for a 
contemporary exposition in international relations theory, see B. Russet and J.R. Oneal, Triangulating Peace: Democracy, 
Interdependence and International Organizations (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 2001). 
15 See E.D. Mansfield, "Preferential Peace: Why Preferential Trading Arrangements Inhibit Interstate Conflict" in E.D. 
Mansfield and B.M. Pollins (ed.), Economic Interdependence and International Conflict: New Perspectives on an Enduring 
Debate (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2003) 222. 
16 In the famous words of Robert Schuman, in the Declaration of May 9, 1950 regarding the establishment of the European 
Coal and Steel Community: "the solidarity in production thus established will make it plain that any war between France and 
Germany becomes not merely unthinkable, but materially impossible". 
17 See e.g. M. Gasiorowski, "Economic Interdependence and International Conflict: Some Cross-National Evidence", (1986) 
30(1) Int. S. Q. 23.; J.R. O'Neal et al., "The Liberal Peace: Interdependence, Democracy and International Conflict, 1950-
1985" (1996) 33(1) J. Peace Research 11.  
18 See, generally, S. W. Polacheck, "Conflict and Trade" (1980) 24(1) J. Conflict Resolution 55. Specific contributions have 
revealed many nuances, for example, the degree to which free trade – rather than simply trade – may be responsible for 
peaceful relations (P.J. Mcdonald, "Peace through Trade or Free Trade?" (2004) 48(4) J. Conflict Resolution 547); the effect of 
size asymmetry on the link between trade and conflict (H. Hegre, "Size Asymmetry, Trade and Military Conflict" (2004) 48(3) 
J. Conflict Resolution 403); or the effect of additional factors such as foreign aid, tariffs, contiguity and country size (S.W. 
Polacheck et al., "Liberalism and Interdependence: Extending the Trade-Conflict Model" (1999) 36(4) J. Peace Research 405).   
19 See, e.g., J.D. Morrow, "How Could Trade Affect Conflict?" (1999) 36(4) J. Peace Research 481; and contributions by J.D. 
Morrow, E. Gartzke, A.A. Stein, J.S. Levy and E.D. Mansfield in Mansfield and Pollins, supra note 15. 
20 Despite the stream of thought according to which interdependence may actually increase the probability of international 
conflict, e.g., K. Waltz, "The Myth of National Interdependence: in C.P. Kindelberger (ed.), The International Corporation 
(Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 1970), and to lesser extent, K. Barbieri, "Economic Interdependence: A Path to Peace or a Source 
of Conflict?" (1996) 33(1) J. Peace Research 29, arguing that the effect of interdependence on peaceful relations varies over 
time and space. 
21 See, recently, C.F. Goenner, "Uncertainty of the Liberal Peace" (2004) 41(5) J. Peace Research 589 (demonstrating through 
model averaging intended to account for uncertainty in model selection, that trade interdependence does not have a significant 
effect on the prediction of militarized conflict). On the challenges to be tackled by future research, see E.D. Mansfield and 
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It would be considerably beyond the scope of this paper to seriously contribute to this 
debate. Moreover, in discussing the role of trade dispute settlement in the promotion of 
international political stability, I do not intend to argue, let alone to prove, that such a role 
exists in a meaningful empirical sense. This would require broader research. Rather, the 
discussion is a contingent, theoretical one: if one accepts Pax Mercatoria, to varying degree, as 
one of the rationales, functions and/or effects of RTAs – either through the increase in trade 
that they bring, the economic interdependence that they promote or by virtue of their 
institutional aspects, or for whatever other plausible reason – what, then, is the anticipated role 
of trade dispute settlement in enacting it? And which model of dispute settlement is appropriate 
for its facilitation? The analysis will thus be limited to proposing the ways in which the 
settlement of trade disputes may contribute to Pax Mercatoria under the latter's own terms.  
 
Furthermore, while the academic debate has focused on the narrower, properly Kantian 
meaning of Pax Mercatoria – put bluntly, that trade promotes peace by preventing the 
emergence of the exceptional condition of war22 – I have here taken some license with the 
term, referring to a broader articulation whereby economic interdependence is perceived as 
reducing political tensions that fall short of military conflict.23 Indeed, this is closer to the more 
complex conceptualization of 'peace and prosperity through interdependence' that is reflected 
in EU policy statements.24 
The question at hand thus becomes: how can trade dispute settlement procedures be 
understood and typified as reducing political friction among RTA partners? For the time being 
this question, as a generalized inquiry, must remain on the theoretical level, as it is fraught with 
problems of measurability and commensurability.25 I will delve into the issue, however, but 
only to the extent necessary to demonstrate that within the Pax Mercatoria concept itself, there 
is room to include reference to an expected positive effect of trade dispute settlement on the 
reduction of political tension in RTAs, albeit subject to certain conditions. As will be seen, the 
main argument is that for trade dispute settlement mechanisms to contribute to the reduction of 
political tension between RTA parties, they must be of an effective judicialized, rather than 
political diplomatic nature.26 This theoretical outline will subsequently be applied to the 
practice and law of trade dispute settlement in EC RTAs.27 
B.M. Pollins, "The Study of Interdependence and Conflict: Recent Advances, Open Questions and Directions for Future 
Research" 2001 45(6) J. Conflict Resolution 834.  
22 For some qualifications see Levy supra note 19.  
23 In this sense I may be culpable for continuing the "failure to distinguish conflict from contests", as lamented by E. Gartzke, 
"The Classical Liberals Were Just Lucky: A Few Thoughts about Interdependence and Peace" in Mansfield and Pollins supra 
note 15, 96.  Moreover, I prefer to consider this as a broadening of the debate to the more general – and realistically relevant – 
questions of the relation between economic interdependence and political stability. I(nternational) R(elations) scholarship's 
preoccupation with military conflict vs. peace is understandable, given the overwhelming destructive effects of war (and also 
its relative ease of measurability and quantification), yet it gains, at times (and paradoxically so, given its liberalist basis), an 
almost Schmittean, dichotomic, perspective of politics ("The sovereign is he who decides on the exception", C. Schmitt (G. 
Schwab, trans. from original German, 1922), Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty (Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press, 1985) 5.  Tomes have been written in either support, apology or derision of the concept of the exception as the 
defining element of politics; see several contributions in D. Dyzenhaus (ed.), Law as Politics: Carl Schmitt’s Critique of 
Liberalism (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1998); another good introduction and critique may be found in O. 
Gross, “The Normless and Exceptionless Exception: Carl Schmitt’s Theory of Emergency Powers and the ‘Norm-Exception’ 
Dichotomy” (2000) 21 Cardozo L. R. 1825). This mode of thinking may threaten to neglect the nuances and textures of real 
international politics. Furthermore, I quite simply contend that the theoretical explanations of the effect of economic 
interdependence on military strife can be extended to explain the mitigating effects on political tensions. 
24 See, e.g., ENP, supra note 3.  
25 For example: how to quantify political friction that does not express itself through the use or threat of force? How to 
associate trade disputes with seemingly unrelated non-trade political issues?  
26 On the difficult divide between diplomatic and judicialized dispute settlement, see A. Reich, “From Diplomacy to Law: The 
Juridicization of International Trade Relations”, (1996-7) 17 Nw. J. Int. L. & Bus. 775; and J.H.H. Weiler, “The Rule of 
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(b) Increased Trade and its Effect on Economic and Political Disputes 
 
First of all, consider that by no means does Pax Mercatoria imply a Pax in Mercatoria, in 
which trade partners will have no differences of interest or disagreements on the interpretation 
and implementation of their mutual RTA obligations. In fact, the proliferation of new rules, 
rights and obligations included in RTAs,28 the increase in inter-partner trade brought on by the 
preferential arrangements of the RTA, as well as the adjustment costs imposed upon less-
efficient domestic sectors in each partner by trade liberalization (creating groups of political 
influential stakeholders that will lobby for external trade measures and/or for the initiation of 
trade disputes, including resorting to political pressure)29 – all these can only be expected to 
increase the intensity and frequency of trade disputes. Thus, a first theoretical inference is that 
we would expect parties to RTAs to have a noticeably higher number of trade disputes between 
them, then in the absence of RTAs.30 
In this respect, it might even be said that the conflict-level between RTA partners will 
actually rise, insofar as disputes over trade are deemed to be part of the overall bank of 
disagreements, political and otherwise. Furthermore, economic disputes may ultimately 
provoke political tensions,31 even unrelated ones, as a form of negative or disruptive issue 
'spill-over'. Thus, RTAs, of themselves – that is, if understood only as a nexus of trade 
obligations – may in fact have a negative effect on political relations – the opposite of Pax 
Mercatoria. Additional elements must be added to RTA relations in order to counteract this 
potential problem. 
 
(c) The Remedial Role of Effective RTA Institutions and Dispute Settlement  
 
This is the point where trade dispute settlement mechanisms become relevant to the idea of 
"peace through trade". The formal aspect of RTAs has a measurable effect on reduction of 
political conflict. In fact, empirical research has shown that trade flows per se have little effect 
on the likelihood of conflict between states that are not mutual RTA partners, but within RTAs 
 
Lawyers and the Ethos of Diplomats: Reflections on the Internal and External Legitimacy of WTO Dispute Settlement” (2001) 
J. World T. 35(2) 191. It has long been the ideology of central streams of thought in international law scholarship that a rule-
based global legal system would best promote worldwide peace(for an intellectual overview see D. Zolo, "Hans Kelsen: 
International Peace Through International Law", (1998) 9(2) Eur. J. Int. L. 306. The proposition here can be seen is a bit different and 
more specific: judicialized dispute settlement best serves the promotion of political stability in systems of economic 
interdependence.   
27 See section IV infra.
28 A typical RTA has between 50 to 200 articles and many annexes and appendices.  
29 This is a simple political economy inference: the sectors are harmed by liberalization will push for protectionist measures 
and any foreign policy act that serves their interest. This can be taken a step further. An occasional theoretical suggestion that 
in my opinion requires additional empirical substantiation, contends that societal sectors that benefit from economic 
protectionism and so suffer from liberalization (as in RTAs), are the same sectors that are most likely to push for aggressive 
foreign policy that may lead to military conflict, but at the very least contributes to political tensions; See McDonald supra 
note 18, building on R. Cobden, The Political Writings of Richard Cobden, Vols. 1-2 (London: William Ridgeway, 1868); R. 
Cobden, Speeches on Questions of Public Policy, edited by J. Bright and J. E. Thorold Rogers, Vols. 1-2 (London Macmillan 
and Co., 1870); and J.A. Schumpeter, "The Sociology of Imperialisms" (1919), trans. H. Norden, in P.M. Sweezy (ed.), 
Imperialism and Social Classes (New York: Augustus M. Kelley, 1951). A reverse formulation is that trade increases the 
incentives of internationalist groups that benefit from trade to pressure government into maintaining a foreign policy 
environment that does not hamper trade (See R. Rogowski, Commerce and Coalitions: How Trade Affects Domestic Political 
Coalitions (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989). 
30 This is yet another issue that would best be subjected to rigorous empirical research. Moreover, this hypothesis can be 
substantiated by some rational induction from real trade disputes: the majority of them would simply not exist without trade 
agreements, for simple lack of legal basis (no obligation, no liability, no dispute).  
31 See A.A. Stein, "Governments, Economic Interdependence and International Cooperation" in P.E. Tetlock et al. (eds.), 
Behavior, Society and Nuclear War, Vol. III (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993). 
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there is a strong negative correlation between trade and political conflict.32 This may suggest, 
inter alia, that beyond the trade effects of the economic mechanisms of RTAs, it is their 
institutional elements that are primarily responsible for reduction of political friction between 
RTA parties.33 These include trade dispute settlement mechanisms.  
 
If trade dispute settlement mechanisms are put in place as part of the RTA, the potential 
increase in trade disputes and residual political effects may be countered by an improved 
method for settling them. If trade dispute settlement mechanisms are effective – that is, capable 
of resolving trade disputes quickly and durably – they will diminish the number of outstanding 
disputes, their duration and intensity. Effective RTA institutions contribute not only to the 
proper implementation of the RTA, but also to the removal of trade disputes and, consequently, 
to the promotion of good political relations.34 Thus, one role played by dispute settlement 
mechanisms in reducing political friction in RTAs, quite simply, is to reduce the salience of 
trade dispute between RTA members, by effectively removing these disputes from the agenda 
of RTA relations. Moreover, this role can be played meaningfully only if dispute settlement 
mechanisms are effective.   
 
(d) The De-linkage Effects of Judicialized RTA Dispute Settlement  
 
In order to reduce political tensions, it is not enough for RTA dispute settlement mechanisms 
to be effective. They must also be detached from the political context of inter-RTA relations. 
To this end they must be judicialized. The well-known arguments for judicialized dispute 
settlement in international trade35 – dispute settlement that is rule-based rather than power-
based, that relies on impartial third-party adjudication instead of negotiation, and that has an 
efficacious method of enforcement -   here gain an additional, regional and political dimension, 
through recourse to theories of Pax Mercatoria.
The classical theoretical argument that links economic integration with peace is the 
'economic opportunity cost hypothesis'.36 War undermines the real and expected economic 
benefits of trade liberalization; this reduces incentives to resort to force,37 sometimes defined 
as a state's 'resolve' to wage war.38 This may arguably be extended to political tension more 
generally. In this vein, strong political disagreements and international crises – even without 
the threat of military intervention – risk undermining RTA benefits.39 For example, political 
 
32 See E.D. Mansfield and J.C. Pevehouse, "Trading Blocs, Trade Flows and International Conflict", (2000) 54(4) International 
Organization 775. Note that the study refers to overt conflict, not to political tensions of a lower degree. 
33 It is, however, possible to argue that this finding shows that it is not the level of actual trade but the degree of protectionism 
that affects political relations (without referring to RTA institutions). For example, Viner posited that heightened barriers to 
international economic activity increase conflicting interests that cause political discord up to the degree of the threat or use of 
force (J. Viner, International Economics (Glencoe: Free Press, 1951), 259). It seems, however, artificial and indeed inaccurate 
to separate the level of barriers to trade from the volume of trade between parties. Even if this approach is adopted, however, 
trade dispute settlement maintains a role in promoting good political relations, if only because they themselves serve to remove 
barriers to trade and to enforce the substantial rules of liberalization in RTAs. 
34 For a related comment, see Mansfield supra note 15. 
35 On the process on the global scale, see J.H. Jackson, The World Trade Organization: Constitution and Jurisprudence 
(London: Royal Institute for Strategic Affairs, 1998).  
36 See Levy supra note 19. 
37 See Mansfield supra note 15. 
38 See Morrow supra note 19. Morrow argues convincingly, on a game-theoretic basis, that contrary to the classical theory, the 
simple 'resolve' effect of trade flows on the likelihood of conflict is indeterminate. However, increased trade flows can prevent 
escalation to war because they provide states with opportunities to signal to each other the degree of their otherwise 
unobservable resolve, for example through the use of trade sanctions.   
39 In fact, some empirical research has shown that there is little difference in trade flows in the shift from a state of poor 
relations to a state of actual conflict; rather, the significant changes in trade occur in shifts from good relations to poor; see D. 
Morrow et al., "The Political Determinants of International Trade: The Major Powers, 1907-1990", (1998) 92(3) Am. Pol. Sci. 
Rev. 649. 
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discord may reduce willingness, at the state level, to comply with RTA obligations, or 
encourage protectionist tendencies (not to mention the less legally tangible effect, at the private 
level, of the unpopular politics of one state upon customer preferences in another, resulting in 
consumer boycotts).40 Ultimately, foreign policy disharmony may cause a party to resort to 
trade measures in support of its political position, even if it is not in conformity with trade 
obligations.  
 
Dispute settlement, if judicialized, may alleviate these problems, by de-linking the trade 
dispute from political processes and considerations. Rule-based dispute settlement becomes 
detached from power ratios. Third-party adjudication detaches the dispute from political 
pressures. Effective enforcement virtually blocks the path of RTA non-compliant economic 
pressure in the service of political interests, and alters the costs that affect a state's 'resolve' in a 
political dispute. Furthermore, as trade disputes emerge, if they are left to resolution 
exclusively at the political-diplomatic level, the inclination to make concessions on demands 
for compliance with the RTA may be low. If trade disputes are settled at a more rule-based, 
even judicial level, they are less liable to contribute to the exacerbation of the political 
disagreement.    
 
On a derivative level, effective rule-based dispute settlement, particularly of a 
judicialized nature, can contribute to the establishment of predictability and security that are 
important to the expansion of trade.41 As such, dispute settlement contributes directly to the 
increase in trade and economic interdependence that underpins Pax Mercatoria; but in 
addition, dispute settlement in this manner contributes to dispute prevention. Future reasons for 
political tension are thus avoided.  
 
Absent judicialized dispute settlement procedures, trade disputes will be managed on 
the diplomatic and political levels. This may produce or enhance linkages between the trade 
issue and political disagreements, politicizing the trade dispute and making it more difficult to 
resolve, while simultaneously increasing political tension. In contrast, specialized judicial trade 
dispute settlement mechanisms can cause two de-linkage effects that reduce political tension. 
First, by preventing or reducing issue linkage to unrelated political disagreements between the 
parties; and second, by keeping the management of the trade dispute contained in a more 
technical, rule-oriented, institutional context. In certain circumstances, such procedures may 
also promote a sense of fairness in the conduct of trade affairs, detaching them from political 
rhetoric and power ploys, as a cultural matter. In sensitive cases this detachment from political 
debate may have the normative disadvantage of leaving rule-making up to technical or legal 
authorities,42 but in the present context it has the advantage of reducing political tension with 
respect to specific disputes.      
 
Thus, the second role played by dispute settlement mechanisms in reducing political 
friction in RTAs, is to de-link and detach trade disputes from the modalities in which the 
economic dispute can impose a negative effect on political relations. This requires a 
judicialized system, that will be isolated, as far as is possible, in its process and its input, from 
the political relationship between RTA parties. 
 
40 Reportedly, France's refusal to cooperate with US policy towards Iraq during 2003 brought a sharp decline in the sale of 
French wine in the US (see, e.g., M. Scram, "Retailers: Some Drinkers Kiss French Wine Goodbye", The Daily Star, 15 May, 
2003, online: http://www.thedailystar.com/news/stories/2003/05/15/wine.html), although this may be attributed in part to other 
more commercial reasons. 
41 See Article 3.2 DSU; and WT/DS152/R US – Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974 , (panel report), paras. 7.75 et seq..
42 See Broude supra note 11, p. 325 et seq. (advocating the invigoration of political decision-making processes in the WTO). 
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(e) Theoretical Conclusions    
 
Pulling these diverse theoretical threads together, and setting aside more general criticism of 
the incompleteness of the Pax Mercatoria concept on both descriptive and normative levels, 
there is assuredly a theoretical case to be made for the contribution of trade dispute settlement 
mechanisms to the reduction of political friction between RTA parties. Moreover, in order to 
contribute to peaceful relations among RTA parties, dispute settlement must be effective. 
Furthermore, it must lean towards rule-based procedures, to the point of judicialization. 
Otherwise, the central advantages of reduction of dispute salience, decoupling from political 
fora and de-linkage from political disagreements are lost, and the positive effect of trade 
dispute settlement on the reduction of political friction is diminished. Bearing these theoretical 
insights in mind, I turn now to an examination of the factual record of intra-RTA dispute 
settlement in NAFTA and EC RTAs.     
 
III. The Factual Record: Where Have All the Disputes Gone? 
 
A survey of EC/RTA-Partner trade disputes must refer not only to those disputes settled within 
RTA systems, but also to those that emerge in the framework of the WTO.43 After all, there are 
many trade issues or trade-related issues that are concurrently governed by WTO and RTA 
disciplines. In which forum the dispute is settled depends on a combination of party 
preferences and the legal framework of juridical interface.44 
Hence, to begin this factual examination, here is a small, yet intriguing and potentially 
significant, empirical puzzle: why is it that parties to EC RTAs have never taken the EC to 
WTO dispute settlement, nor (almost)45 vice versa?46 Of 317 WTO trade disputes initiated to 
date,47 the EC has been directly complained against in over 40 cases and has itself brought 
 
43 In fact, the fullest possible discussion of disputes between RTA partners must also look 'down' at the domestic level, not only 
'up' at the WTO level. Many disputes that reflect international trade or trade-related differences do, can or should reach 
domestic judicial systems, enabled by private rights of action and the direct effect of international law in domestic systems. 
These may either take the form of private challenges to economic policy within the jurisdiction of the challenged state (e.g., 
Chapter 11 NAFTA or domestic/Community judicial processes against measures taken by the Community/Member; or of 
private action within a state whose rights may have been impaired, with the intention of urging international action against the 
actions and policies of another state (e.g., Section 301-310 and the EC's Trade Barriers Regulation (TBR) (Council Regulation 
(EC) No 3286/94 of 22 December 1994 laying down Community procedures in the field of the common commercial policy in 
order to ensure the exercise of the Community's rights under international trade rules, in particular those established under 
the auspices of the World Trade Organization). A full discussion of these options would, however, far transcend the scope of 
this paper. In this respect the reader is referred to the general literature on Chapter 11 NAFTA; on the direct effect of the WTO 
and RTAs in EC law; on the TBR; and on a more modest scale, on the effect of international trade law in the courts of the EC's 
trade partners, such as Israel.   
44 For an extremely illuminating case study of the considerations determining choice of forum, in this case between the 
Administration Commission of the Chile-MERCOSUR Agreement and the WTO, see D. Tussie and V. Delich, "The Political 
Economy of Dispute Settlement:  Case From Argentina", August, 2004, Mimeo, on file with author. 
45 The sole existing example of a WTO dispute between the EC and an RTA-partner is, at the time of writing, still at the 
consultations stage (see WT/DS314/1 Mexico – Provisional Countervailing Measures on Olive Oil from the European 
Communities – Request for Consultations by the European Communities, 24 August, 2004 (Mexico – Olive Oil). As will 
emerge in greater detail below, the EC's economic and legal relations with Mexico, as related to the specifics of this case, are 
substantially different from the norm in the EC's existing regional relations, and are not representative of the EC's 'extra-
regional' RTA relations; and so the case may serve as an exception elucidating, if not proving, the rule.  
46 The most obvious answer could have been that EC RTA dispute settlement procedures are formally established to the 
exclusion of all others; as will be described below, this is not, however, the case. See section IV infra.
47 For a chronological list of all dispute settlement proceedings initiated in the WTO since its establishment in 1995, see online, 
WTO, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_status_e.htm. 'Initiation' in this case means a request for 
Consultations under Article 4 of the WTO DSU. In other contexts, mainly of RTA provisions, the meaning of an 'initiation' of 
dispute settlement procedures may be restricted to the more advanced stage of the request for a Panel under Article 6 DSU or 
an equivalent stage under RTA rules; see infra section IV.  
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some 50 cases – nearly one-third of proceedings initiated.48 Many of these have directly 
involved the United States (US) or Japan, while others have been with economically important 
developing countries such as Brazil, India and Argentina. Yet despite this record of intensive 
WTO litigation the EC has only once, indeed very recently, taken one of its RTA partners to 
task in the WTO.49 The opposite instance has never emerged, so far, even though in several 
cases, disputes had in the past been taken to the WTO, both by the EC and by certain 
subsequent RTA partners, before the establishment of an RTA.50 The curiosity of the absence 
of EC/RTA-partner WTO disputes becomes even more conspicuous when one realizes that the 
US, by contrast, has been party to numerous formally adjudicated WTO disputes with both its 
NAFTA partners, Canada and Mexico, as both complainant and respondent.51 Many, if not all, 
of these WTO disputes could have been settled through a variety of NAFTA procedures;52 in 
other cases, NAFTA dispute settlement procedures have been applied to issues that could have 
otherwise been settled in the WTO.  
 
A derivative, factual question here arises, whose solution may cast some light on the 
initial puzzle: where have all the EC/RTA-partner disputes gone? In practice, the answer is 
simple: where inter-NAFTA disputes sometimes reach the WTO dispute settlement system, 
EC/RTA-partner disputes remain securely within the domain of each of the EC RTA systems. 
Seeking to complete the statistical mapping of disputes instigated above, our curiosity is 
aroused: how many such EC/RTA-partner disputes have arisen? Which party initiated them, 
how many have reached third-party dispute settlement, how have they been settled and in 
which party's favour?  
 
Tellingly, these questions cannot easily be answered for lack of readily accessible 
information. Whatever partial knowledge might be gleaned would require a considerable 
amount of sleuthing among trade cognoscenti in five continents, and remain essentially 
 
48 EC direct involvement in completed dispute settlement procedures is even more salient – over 40 disputes out of a total of 
approximately 110 (in this calculation, Article 21.5 DSU compliance panels are not counted but regarded as part of the original 
procedures; this may have a distortive effect, with the EC's involvement in the system actually being somewhat higher than 
indicated).  
49 Mexico – Olive Oil, supra note 45. 
50 In these cases, the WTO dispute was either resolved or dissolved before or in parallel with the agreement upon or 
establishment of the RTA (and not necessarily as a result thereof). With Mexico (the "Global Agreement" with the EC 
(Economic Partnership, Political Coordination and Cooperation Agreement between the European Community and its 
Member States, of the one part, and the United Mexican States, of the other part - Final Act - Declarations 
O.J. L 276 , October 28, 2000, pp. 45-79) entered into force on 1 October 2000), pre-RTA disputes include: WT/DS158/1 
European Communities - Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas - Request for Consultations by 
Honduras, Mexico, Guatemala, Panama and the United States, January 25, 1999 (Panel never requested); WT/DS53/1 Mexico 
- Customs Valuation of Imports - Request for Consultations by the European Communities , 9 September, 1996 (Panel never 
requested); and WT/DS27 European Communities - Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas –
Complaint by Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico and the United States (the last determination made by the WTO dispute 
settlement system in this case was a decision by Article 22.6 WTO arbitrators given on 24 March, 2000 
(WT/DS27/ARB/ECU); moreover, the Bananas' saga paper-trail reveals that Mexico was not actively involved from a much 
earlier stage. With Chile (Agreement Establishing an Association between the European Community and its Member States, of 
the One Part, and the Republic of Chile, of the Other Part, signed 18 November, 2002, not yet in full effect, online: 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/issues/bilateral/countries/chile/docs/euchlagr_i.pdf (Chile-EC Association Agreement)), pre-
RTA disputes include: DS/WT193/2 Chile - Measures Affecting the Transit and Importation of Swordfish - Request for the 
Establishment of a Panel by the European Communities (Panel constitution suspended indefinitely by EC-Chile arrangement 
notified in WT/DS193/3, 7 November, 2000); and WT/DS110 Chile - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages (last determination made 
by the WTO dispute settlement system in this case was an Article 21.3(c) DSU Arbitrator's award made on 23 May, 2000 
(WT/DS87/15). There have been no pre-RTA WTO disputes between the EC and other RTA partners. 
51 The US has, to date, initiated 6 WTO disputes with Mexico and 4 with Canada. No less than 18 WTO disputes have been 
initiated by Canada and Mexico, combined, with the US.  
52 Shany (supra note 9 at 56-57) assumes that in all the 15 such cases identified at the time of his writing, the WTO and 
NAFTA had "overlapping jurisdiction"; such a finding regarding these and subsequent cases may, however, require more 
detailed case-specific analysis.   
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tangential to the disputes themselves, at best, or anecdotal, at worst.53 In contrast to the WTO 
(or NAFTA), there is no official roster of EC/RTA-partner disputes, neither on an individual 
RTA basis, nor on a combined, cumulative one. There is no website that lists or tracks them. 
Requests for bilateral consultations within RTA institutional frameworks (let alone casual 
diplomatic discussions of problems that might otherwise be regarded as disputes) or recourse to 
more structured dispute settlement procedures within RTAs are not regularly a matter of public 
record, save for occasional reports in the formal or informal press. Even the EC Commission's 
Directorate-General for international trade apparently does not keep a collective list of disputes 
with the EC's RTA partners, but rather deals with them on a specific, bilateral or regional 
basis.54 Much as the transparency of WTO dispute settlement may be criticized,55 the practice 
of EC RTA disputes is, infinitely less accessible to the interested observer. While it is not 
inconceivable that the EC simply has very few disputes with its RTA partners, this observation 
is perhaps indicative of a more generalized attribute of EC RTA dispute procedures – their 
inherently non-judicialized character - to which I shall return later.56 
Another relevant fact arises here, placing the initial puzzle in proper empirical context. 
Most EC RTA-partners do not resort to use of the WTO dispute settlement procedures at all,
not just versus the EC. Only two current EC RTA-partners have made regular use of the WTO 
dispute settlement system, and they are both geographically 'extra-regional' to the EC: 
Mexico57 and Chile.58 The EC's properly regional Euro-Mediterranean RTA partners 
 
53 For example, consider the dispute between the EC and Israel over the trade status of the produce of Israeli enterprises 
located in the Golan Heights, East Jerusalem, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Although this dispute extended for a few 
years, arguably, the only formal expression of its existence is an EC Avis (O.J. 2001/C 328/04, 23 November 2003) excluding 
products of these territories from the preferential tariff treatment accorded to Israel under the EC-Israel Association Agreement 
(Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an association between the European Communities and their Member States, on 
the one part, and the State of Israel, of the other part, O..J. L 147, 21 June, 2000, 3). For descriptions and analyses of this 
dispute, see G. Harpaz, "The Dispute over the Treatment of Products Exported to the European Union from the Golan Heights, 
East Jerusalem, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip - The Limits of Power and the Limits of the Law", J. World .T. 
(forthcoming); M. Hirsch, "Rules of Origin as Foreign Policy Instruments?" (2003) 26 Fordham Int. L. J. 572; C. Hauswaldt, 
"Problems under the EC-Israel Association Agreement: The Export of Goods Produced in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip 
under the EC-Israel Association Agreement", (2003) 14(3) Eur. J. Int. L. 591; and L. Zemer and S. Pardo, "The Qualified 
Zones in Transition: Navigating the Dynamics of the Euro-Israeli Customs Dispute" (2003) 8(1) Eur. Foreign Aff. Rev. 5.  
54 This is reflected – and may be the result – of DG Trade's organizational structure; there is no Directorate entrusted with 
bilateral or regional dispute settlement (although there is one in charge of WTO dispute settlement); see online, 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/whatwedo/whois/index_en.htm.
55 Lack of transparency in the WTO in general and its dispute settlement system in particular is a regular complaint from 
segments of international civil society, particularly "antiglobalist" (see e.g., “‘WTO - Shrink or Sink!’ - The Turnaround 
Agenda International Civil Society Sign-On Letter”, online: Public Citizen 
<http://www.citizen.org/trade/wto/shrink_sink/articles.cfm?ID=1569> (last accessed: 20 October, 2004): "The WTO system, 
rules and procedures are undemocratic, un-transparent and non-accountable and have operated to marginalize the majority of 
the world's people"’ (emphasis added). The transparency of the system has, however, been identified by many more 
disinterested commentators as requiring improvement. What is particularly frustrating, from a WTO-watcher's perspective, is 
the public inaccessibility of party submissions in disputes (that remain confidential unless publicized by the parties themselves) 
and Interim Panel Reports (issued to parties under Article 15 DSU); in the latter case, one may know for weeks or even months 
(on a 'leaked' basis) what the result of a Panel Report will be, without having access to the legal analysis of the anticipated 
Report (this has been the case in many disputes; for example, the outcome of the interim report in WT/DS285 US – Measures 
Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services was reported on 25 March, 2004 (see 21(13) BNA 
International Trade Reporter, "Antigua-Barbuda Wins WTO Interim Ruling Against US Internet Gambling Restrictions"); at 
the time of writing, towards the end of October, 2004, the interim report is not yet publicly available and the final report has 
yet to be issued (due to procedural agreements between the parties, postponing the end of the panel process (see 
WT/DS285/5/Add.2 US – Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services – Communication 
from the Chairman of the Panel – Addendum, 11 October, 2004, suspending panel proceedings until 16 November, 2004 to 
allow for the continuation of bilateral discussions. In addition, there is a sentiment growing among WTO practitioners and 
scholars that WTO Reports are simply becoming too difficult and convoluted for the reader to follow; what is inaccessible to 
the expert is certainly opaque to the lay person, resulting in a lack of transparency. 
56 See section IV infra.
57 See Global Agreement, supra note 50.  
58 See EC-Chile Association Agreement, supra note 50. 
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completely avoid WTO dispute settlement,59 as has South Africa, at least so far. Turkey has 
participated in only two cases as a complainant, staying safely in the consultations stage.60 
Looking back at the record of the now superseded 'European Partnership' Association 
Agreements',61 Central and Eastern European states that have subsequently acceded to the EU 
made very limited use of WTO dispute settlement; when they did it was usually in WTO 
diplomatic consultations among each other.62 Switzerland, Norway, Liechtenstein and Iceland, 
the EC's trading partners who are members of European Free Trade Agreement (EFTA) (the 
first on the basis of numerous bilateral agreements; the latter three as EC partners in the 
European Economic Area (EEA)) have made some marginal use of the WTO system, mainly at 
the level of consultations – none of them has ever been a party to a dispute that reached a Panel 
Report.63 
In contrast, all three NAFTA Parties are important users of the WTO dispute settlement 
system, not only among themselves, but with a range of additional parties. This makes the 
difference between the US/NAFTA and EC/RTA experiences less puzzling – the propensity to 
either launch or avoid WTO dispute procedures apparently remains unchanged by the 
respective regional arrangements. The reasons why RTA partners avoid WTO disputes are 
presumably a combination of country-specific attributes along with a number of inter-related 
contributing factors of a general nature, such as trade volumes and patterns, financial 
capabilities, economic and political power differentials, and judicial acculturation; this is an 
interesting question, worthy perhaps of further research, but for present purposes, I will take 
the facts at face-value: the EC's 'regional' RTA partners can be characterized as 'WTO dispute-
averse'.  
 
59 Egypt, Tunisia, Israel, Jordan and Morocco are all WTO Members and have Association Agreements with the EC. Algeria, 
Lebanon and the Palestinian Authority are parties to Association Agreements but are not WTO Members; Syria initialed an 
Association Agreement very recently (see EC Press Release,  "EU and Syria Mark End of Negotiations for an Association 
Agreement", IP/04/1246, Brussels, 19 October, 2004, online: 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/syria/intro/ip04_1246.htm, but is not a WTO Member (note that Lebanon and 
Syria were original contracting parties to the GATT 1947, but are also the only sates to have withdrawn from the GATT, in 
1951, for political reasons (on WTO accession and Membership of Arab states and the Palestinian Authority see T. Broude, 
"WTO Accession: Current Issues in the Arab World", (1998) 32(6) J. World T. 147). Israel has thrice requested to join 
consultations (as a third-party): in an EC complaint against Canada regarding pharmaceutical patent protection, in which Israel 
supported the basic Canadian position not only in consultations but before the Panel (Canada – Patent Protection of 
Pharmaceutical Products – Complaint by the European Communities and their Member States, WT/DS114/R); in 
the EC complaint in United States – Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974 – Report of the Panel, WT/DS152/R, 
in which Israel reserved third-party rights but did not exercise them before the panel; and in an EC complaint against 
the US, which did not crystallize into an adjudicated dispute (see WT/DS212/3 US – Countervailing Measures Concerning 
Certain Products from the European Communities – Request to Join Consultations – Communication from Israel, 20 
December, 2003) (for a history of Israel's participation in the GATT/WTO system, with reference to dispute settlement, see (in 
Hebrew), A. Reich, "The History of the State of Israel's Participation in the GATT and WTO" in A. Reich (ed.), The World 
Trade Organization and Israel: Law, Economics and Politics (forthcoming, Bar Ilan University Press). Morocco has once 
submitted an Amicus Curiae brief, in EC  – Trade Description of Sardines (2002), WTO Doc. WT/DS231/AB/R (Appellate 
Body Report) (see discussion at para. 153 et seq.); interestingly, in this case – a complaint by Peru against the EC – Morocco 
chose not to participate even as a third-party taking a stand against the EC, as if to underline its dispute-averseness, but also its 
unwillingness to confront the EC.  
60 Turkey has twice requested WTO consultations: WT/DS211/1 Egypt - Definitive Anti-dumping Measures on Steel Rebar 
from Turkey - Request for Consultations by Turkey; and WT/DS288/1 South Africa - Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on 
Blanketing from Turkey - Request for Consultations by Turkey. Only in the former case has a panel been established, but no 
report has been issued. 
61 See infra note 91.  
62 For example, WT/DS240/2 Romania - Import Prohibition on Wheat and Wheat Flour - Request for the Establishment of a 
Panel by Hungary , 28 November 2001 (later withdrawn).  
63 Norway and Switzerland have both been involved in proceedings entailing the establishment of a panel, but one of these has 
been followed through to the report stage.  
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This empirical overview thus provides us with two modest conclusions that stem from 
exploring the implications of the initial puzzle. First, we know that most EC RTA partners – 
certainly the truly 'regional' ones, that are located within the EC's geographical hinterlands – 
are WTO dispute-averse in general. This may circumstantially explain the absence of WTO 
disputes initiated by EC RTA partners against the EC. Moreover, it does not explain why the 
EC, who has been directly responsible for the initiation of 16% of all WTO disputes,64 does not 
itself regularly take its 'regional' RTA partners to the WTO dispute settlement system. Second, 
we are armed with the (somewhat murky) knowledge that EC/RTA-partner disputes (however 
numerous and intensive they may be) normally remain in the non-transparent shadows of RTA 
systems.  
 
What now begs clarification is the legal dimension of this factual constellation. The low 
visibility of EC/RTA-partner disputes can be interpreted as having two diverging significances. 
Either the EC RTAs have a dispute settlement system that is incredibly effective, so as to 
reduce their salience to substantially zero – a positive effect in terms of Pax Mercatoria theory; 
or the low visibility is due to the legal fact that RTA dispute settlement systems are so non-
judicial that disputes remain in the non-transparent RTA arena – decidedly contrary to the 
prescriptions of Pax Mercatoria. To determine which of these possible explanations is correct, 
an analysis of the RTA's dispute settlement provisions is helpful. In this vein, I turn now to a 
stylized comparative discussion and characterization of relevant aspects of EC RTA (and for 
comparative purposes, NAFTA) dispute settlement provisions.65 
IV. The Legal Parameters of Pax Mercatoria: Effectiveness and Judicialization 
 
(a) General 
 
As discussed in section II, in order to serve a Pax Mercatoria purpose, RTA dispute settlement 
must be effective – capable of resolving disputes in a relatively short timeframe and with 
durable effect; and judicialized – a system of rule-based, third party adjudication with 
mechanisms of enforcement. In this section we review these parameters in relevant RTAs, to 
assess the extent to which theory predicts that they will promote a reduction of political 
tension. 
 
Moreover, all of the dispute settlement systems discussed here – the WTO, NAFTA, 
and the various EC RTAs - incorporate a degree of what has been called judicialized or 
"juridicized"66 dispute settlement. They all include elements of international adjudication 
regimes.67 In each of them, there is a formally pre-agreed possibility that a trade dispute will be 
settled by an impartial third party (but they do not all include comprehensive mechanisms of 
enforcement, that is rightly a constituent part of judicilization). The critical parameter is 
therefore not the ultimate level of judicial dispute settlement that each system offers its parties 
– their 'highest common denominator' - but rather the conditions that apply and the ease of 
access to these judicial processes. This parameter, a component of judicialization, shall be 
referred to here as the automaticity of the judicialized process. A process in which the 
 
64 See supra, text accompanying note 48 
65 This survey of EC RTAs omits reference to EC agreements with Turkey; the European Economic Area (EEA) partners 
(Iceland, Norway and Liechtenstein); and Switzerland, each of which maintains a special relationship with the EC, that is 
expressed in the dispute resolution mechanisms that apply to them.  
66 See Reich, supra note 26. 
67 On this term and for a general typology of trade dispute settlement regimes, see A.K. Schneider, “Getting Along: The 
Evolution of Dispute Resolution Regimes in International Trade Regimes”, (1999) 20 Mich. J. Int. L. 697. 
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judicialization of the dispute requires consent of a party, or is free from binding time 
restrictions – allowing for the establishment of a judicial procedure to be blocked indefinitely - 
is non-automatic; in contrast, a process that is compulsory to all parties, and must take place 
within obligatory time limits, is automatic. 
 
Furthermore, each of the RTAs discussed here allows, to varying extent, recourse to 
judicialized WTO dispute settlement, in the case of a dispute between the parties that can be 
subjected to either regional or WTO jurisdiction. Thus, it might be said that all the RTA 
systems are similarly judicialized, by assimilating the WTO process as their own. This might 
have been true, but for the different terms in which various RTAs allow access to the WTO – 
their choice of forum provisions. Choice of forum may also be influenced by the substantive 
law that will apply in each forum. A party that calculates that it has "more" or better rights in 
one forum, or that it loses rights by choosing the other, will act accordingly. The applicability 
of WTO law in each RTA is also significant. Choice of forum and applicable law – juridical 
interface – are therefore the second parameter of judicialization relevant in the present context. 
The parameters of judicialization to be examined in RTAs in the context of Pax Mercatoria are 
therefore (1) automaticity of judicial dispute settlement; and (2) the juridical interface between 
the dispute settlement mechanisms of the RTA and the WTO.      
 
(b) NAFTA Dispute Settlement  
 
(i) NAFTA and Pax Mercatoria: Background 
 
As a comparative benchmark, we turn first to the NAFTA. As we have already seen, 
the NAFTA's intergovernmental dispute settlement procedures68 have been employed by all 
NAFTA parties, and there has been no shortage of WTO disputes between them either. The 
design of dispute settlement procedures may be related to this practice, and in turn may relate 
to the effect of dispute settlement on political stability. To be sure, Pax Mercatoria was not a 
dominant rationale for the establishment of NAFTA. Although the US has had a history of 
belligerence with both its contiguous neighbors, which may have a residual effect on certain 
cultural aspects of its foreign relations, this negative narrative is largely a thing of the distant 
past. It is commonly accepted that NAFTA has no agenda of political integration, overt or 
otherwise. This does not, however, preclude the NAFTA from having, in practice, a Pax 
Mercatoria effect, regardless of pre-formulated intentions. There is no question that the closer 
economic relations caused by NAFTA have had a positive influence on US-Mexico-Canada 
political relations (or at least, have not had a negative effect). Thus, there is no reason not to 
examine the possible links between NAFTA dispute settlement effectiveness, the 
NAFTA/WTO juridical interface and reduced political tensions. 
 
(ii) Effectiveness of intergovernmental NAFTA dispute settlement 
 
The default dispute settlement provisions of Chapter 20 NAFTA, that apply to all issues 
"regarding the interpretation and application" of NAFTA not otherwise provided for (such as 
Chapter 19 NAFTA antidumping and countervailing duty matters) are subject to a series of 
time-limits, resulting in a total time span of up to 240 days between a NAFTA party's request 
 
68 We focus on the provisions of Chapter 19 (Review and Dispute Settlement in Antidumping and Countervailing Duty 
Matters) and Chapter 20 NAFTA (Institutional Arrangements and Dispute Settlement Procedures); Chapter 11, Section B 
NAFTA (Settlement of Disputes between a Party and an Investor of Another Party) applies in a non-intergovernmental context 
and should be dealt with separately (see note 43 supra). On NAFTA investment law, see T. Weiler (ed.), NAFTA Investment 
Law and Arbitration: Past Issues, Current Practice, Future Prospects (New York: Transnational publishers, 2004). 
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for consultations and the presentation of a report by an arbitral panel established under Article 
2008.2 NAFTA. Of course parties can allow derogations from the constituent time limits at 
various stages in the process, but this would require either the consent of all parties, or a party 
postponing the exercise of a right, as the case may be.69 With respect to antidumping and 
countervailing duty issues, binational review Panels70 are normally expected to complete their 
work within 315 days of the date on which a request for a Panel is made (Article 1904.14 
NAFTA). In the case of an Extraordinary Challenge Procedure, the Extraordinary Challenge 
Committee must reach a decision within 90 days of its establishment (Article 2, Annex 
1904.13 NAFTA). As far as the conclusiveness of results, disputes that have reached panel 
arbitration have produced conclusive results, and been complied with, even if adverse to a 
party's interests.71 
(iii) Automaticity 
 
The timeframes of Chapters 19 and 20 NAFTA are mandatory, subject to contrary agreement 
by the parties (and in Chapter 20, to the right of a party to postpone exercising an option to 
escalate the dispute. Once requested, NAFTA parties have no option to block the establishment 
and selection of Chapter 20 Arbitral Panels or Chapter 19 binational Review Panels. Under 
Article 2011 NAFTA, if the disputing parties are unable to agree on the chair of an Arbitral 
Panel within 15 days of the delivery of a request for the establishment of a Panel, "the 
disputing Party chosen by lot shall select within five days as chair an individual who is not a 
citizen" of that party (Article 2011.1(a) NAFTA). Subsequently, even if a disputing party fails 
to select Panelists within 15 days of the selection of the chair (each party must select two 
Panelists who are citizens of the other disputing party (Article 2011.1(b)), such Panelists will 
be selected by lot from the members of the roster of Panelists who are citizens of the other 
disputing party (Article 2011.1(c) NAFTA). Similar provisions govern the establishment and 
selection of binational Review Panels and Extraordinary Challenge Committees under Chapter 
19 NAFTA.72 The initiation of intergovernmental judicialized dispute settlement in the 
NAFTA is therefore automatic (subject to the right of a complainant to postpone the escalation 
of a dispute). 
 
Reports by Chapter 19 binational review panels also gain legal effect (Article 1904.9 
NAFTA) automatically. As for the reports of Chapter 20 arbitral panels, under Article 2018.1 
NAFTA, the settlement of a dispute is by agreement between the parties, "which normally shall 
conform with the determinations and recommendations of the panel", ostensibly leaving the 
door open to the blocking of a panel report by a disputing party. Article 2019.1 NAFTA makes 
clear, however, that the final report of an arbitral panel can be the basis for the suspension of 
NAFTA benefits by the aggrieved party, unless the disputing parties have reached a mutually 
satisfactory under article 2018.1. In other words, Chapter 20 panel reports have legal effect, 
unless overridden by an agreement between the parties. The legal effect of panel decisions in 
NAFTA is therefore also automatic.  
 
69 In practice, Chapter 20 disputes have extended over longer periods, primarily because parties have chosen to continue 
consultations and "not to formally escalate a dispute to Commission Review"; see D. Lopez, "Dispute Settlement Under 
NAFTA: Lessons from the Early Experience" (1997) 32 Texas Int. L. J. 163, 205. This is not a "breach" of NAFTA Chapter 20 
requirements, since under Articles 2007-2008, the shift from consultations, to Committee review and then to a request for a 
panel, are matters of party discretion (employing the permissive "may") 
70 Note that Chapter 19 NAFTA procedures are not fully intergovernmental, but rather of a hybrid binational/domestic 
character, as discussed below. They are noted here for the purpose of comprehensive review only. 
71 See Lopez supra note 69, 200-204. 
72 See Article 2-4, Annex 1901.2 and Article 1, Annex 1904.13 NAFTA. 
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 (iv) The NAFTA/WTO Juridical Interface 
(a) Choice of forum in Chapter 20 NAFTA  
 
Choice of forum is expressly and specifically regulated in Chapter 20 NAFTA. Article 2005.1 
NAFTA provides that "disputes regarding any matter that arises under both" the NAFTA and 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) (and, by succession, the WTO),73 may be 
settled in either forum at the discretion of the complaining party. Several exceptions apply to 
this rule. If the complaining party initiates a WTO dispute, a NAFTA third party may request 
that the dispute be settled in NAFTA; if parties cannot agree on the forum, the dispute 
"normally shall be settled under" the NAFTA (Article 2005.1). In cases involving 
environmental issues, sanitary and phytosanitray measures or technical standards, the 
responding party may demand that the matter be settled under the NAFTA (Article 2005.3-4 
NAFTA). Whichever forum is selected, it becomes the exclusive forum for the dispute (Article 
2005.6 NAFTA). 
 
These rules make it clear that recourse to judicial proceedings – either in the NAFTA or the 
WTO – are a natural part of the legal relations between the NAFTA parties. Not only does the 
NAFTA provide for a judicialized system of dispute settlement, in addition to the WTO, but 
the access of parties to both alternate systems has itself been legalized, detached from political 
processes and pressures, in the form of plain rules on choice of forum.    
 
(b) Choice of forum in Chapter 19 NAFTA 
 
In contrast to Chapter 20, Chapter 19 does not expressly acknowledge the possibility of WTO 
and NAFTA fora dealing with the same dispute, and does not itself prohibit it. In fact, several 
cases have been adjudicated in parallel in both GATT/WTO and NAFTA (including its 
bilateral predecessor, the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement (CUSFTA)74 dispute settlement 
systems, most famously in the ongoing softwood lumber saga between Canada and the US.75 
Indeed, commentators have discussed the choice between the respective fora in terms of the 
policy benefits of each system,76 rather than as matters of law.  
 
The logic behind not making NAFTA and WTO procedures mutually exclusive in this 
field appears to be that Chapter 19 NAFTA and WTO proceedings are not competing 
procedures in conflict with each other, in the technical sense. This is because of the hybrid 
character of Chapter 19 as a binational/domestic proceeding – Chapter 19 NAFTA is not 
intended to replace challenges under international law, but is rather designed to replace 
domestic judicial review of final antidumping and countervailing duty determinations with 
binational review. As a result, the applicable law is not the same.77 Chapter 19 reviews the 
determinations under the law that would have applied in the domestic court of review, 
 
73 The NAFTA was signed during the Uruguay Round negotiations in GATT, before the term "WTO" had even been debated; 
NAFTA negotiators took into account the expansion and replacement of the GATT 1947, applying Article 2005.1 NAFTA not 
only to the GATT but also to "any agreement negotiated thereunder, or any successor agreement"; for discussion, see Abbott 
supra note 9.  
74 Free Trade Agreement between Canada and the United States entered into between the Government of Canada and the 
Government of the United States signed on 2 January, 1988. 
75 For convenient access to WTO and NAFTA litigation documents in this dispute, see online, International Trade Canada, 
http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/eicb/softwood/legal_action-en.asp.
76 See R. Howse, Settling Trade Remedy Disputes: When The WTO Forum is Better than the NAFTA, C.D. Howe Institute 
Commentary No. 111, (Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute, 1998).  
77 See, accord, Shany supra note 9, 55. 
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including the standard of review, which differs among NAFTA members.78 Furthermore, the 
parties in WTO and NAFTA proceedings will not be the same: in the WTO, only the states 
involved will be party to the dispute, while in Chapter 19 NAFTA, the parties will be the 
agency that made the disputed determination and any person who would have had the right to 
appear in the domestic judicial review process (Article 1904.7). Thus, Chapter 20 rules on 
choice of forum do not apply,79 and even if they did, Article 2005.6 NAFTA on the mutual 
exclusivity of NAFTA and GATT/WTO procedures refers specifically to Article 2007 NAFTA 
procedures, excluding Chapter 19 from its scope.  
 
Beyond these legal distinctions, however, what is important for our present purposes is 
that Chapter 19 NAFTA's failure to regulate the choice of forum has (perhaps deliberately) 
resulted in an increase in judicialized options for dispute settlement, allowing practical access 
to both judicial systems. 
 
(c) Applicable law and conflicts of norms 
 
The priority and extent of the application of WTO law in Chapter 20 NAFTA proceedings is 
notoriously uncertain, due to a drafting inconsistency in Article 103 NAFTA, that affirms 
parties' rights under GATT, but not under successor agreements and agreements negotiated 
thereunder, as in Article 2005 NAFTA on choice of forum (in Chapter 19, the status of WTO 
law will be as determined by the national law being applied).80 Practically, in one Chapter 20 
NAFTA (and previously, several Chapter 18 CUSFTA) cases, the issue did not present a 
problem because the RTA provisions in question were identical to or incorporations of 
GATT/WTO treaty provisions, and GATT/WTO jurisprudence was used in their 
interpretation.81 Where an alleged conflict has arisen, the panel interpreted it away.82 Where 
non-specifically incorporated GATT/WTO provisions have been relied on by a complaining 
party, the panel did not address the issue, having found sufficient cause for accepting the 
complaint on the basis of NAFTA law alone.83 
Despite the uncertainty involved, it can be said generally that NAFTA parties do not have 
to be concerned that recourse to Chapter 20 NAFTA rather than WTO procedures will be 
accompanied by an erosion of substantive WTO rights, unless a specific conflict is identified. 
Moreover, because Chapter 20 forces the complaining party to choose one forum to the 
exclusion of the other, NAFTA parties considering a Chapter 20 complaint must carefully 
analyze the costs and benefits of using NAFTA rather than the WTO, including financial costs 
and procedural issues such as the appropriateness of either NAFTA or WTO enforcement 
measures in each case. What is notable in the present context, however, is that the dilemma of 
choosing the best forum, is one based almost entirely on a the comparison of the legal 
advantages and disadvantages of two distinct judicialized dispute settlement systems. 
 
78 See Article 1904.3 NAFTA and Annex 1911 (country specific definitions) NAFTA. 
79 Under article 2004 NAFTA, Chapter 20 procedures apply only to disputes "between the Parties" to the NAFTA. 
80 See Abbott supra note 9, 178-181 and 183-184. 
81 E.g., NAFTA, Arbitral Panel Established Pursuant to Chapter Twenty in the Matter of Cross-Border Trucking Services 
(Secretariat File No. USA-MEX-98-2008-01, Final Report of the Panel, 6 February, 2001 (relying on the similarity between 
article 2101 NAFTA and article XX GATT); and CUSFTA, In the Matter of Canada's Landing Requirement For Pacific Coast 
Salmon and Herring, Final Report of the Panel, 16 October, 1989 (dealing with Article XI GATT by virtue of its incorporation 
into the CUSFTA by Article 47 thereof). 
82 See NAFTA, Arbitral Panel Established Pursuant to Article 2008 in the Matter of Tariffs Applied by Canada to Certain US-
Origin Agricultural Products (Secretariat File CDA-95-2008-01), Final Report of the Panel, 2 December, 1996 (resolving the 
conflict finding a specific priority of norms based on in Article 710 CUSFTA as incorporated to NAFTA by Article 702 and 
Annex 702.1 NAFTA). 
83 See NAFTA, Arbitral Panel Established under Chapter Twenty, In the Matter of the US Safeguard Action Taken on Broom 
Corn Brooms from Mexico (Secretariat File No. USA-97-208-01), Final Report of the Panel, 30 January, 1998. 
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Importantly, there is no systemic prejudice in favor of political settlement, but neither has this 
prevented extensive use of the system of consultations or Free Trade Committee review in 
attempts, some successful, to reach mutually agreed resolution of disputes).84 
(iv) NAFTA and Pax Mercatoria: Conclusions 
It is clear from this discussion that NAFTA dispute settlement conforms to the pro-Pax 
Mercatoria model, in both law and practice. Procedures are effective, making determinations 
within predetermined and realistically short timeframes (while allowing the space needed for 
parties to try and negotiate a settlement). Both the initiation and legal effect of procedures are 
automatic. The juridical interface with the WTO is itself legalized, accepting recourse to 
judicial proceedings in either forum as a natural part of relations between the parties, in fact 
increasing their litigation alternatives; and the law applied in NAFTA does not have any 
indirect influence on the choice between informal diplomatic deliberation and access to 
judicialized dispute settlement in either the NAFTA or the WTO.  
 
It is clear now, in reference to both the theoretical outline of section II and the factual 
record set out in section III, why there is a highly visible number of disputes between NAFTA 
members in both the NAFTA and the WTO. The NAFTA does not suppress judicial dispute 
settlement, but encourages it in lieu of unfruitful political-diplomatic dispute negotiation that 
might disrupt political relations. The NAFTA acknowledges that increased trade and economic 
interdependence may ampliy the level and intensity of disputes between RTA members (as 
predicted by theory)85 and opts for effective, judicialized procedures (either in the NAFTA 
itself, or by specifically regulating juridical interface with the WTO) to counter this trend. This 
has (unintentionally, perhaps) had the effect of conforming to the Pax Mercatoria model of 
RTA dispute settlement. 
 
(c) The European Partnership and Euro-Mediterranean Agreements 
 
(i) The dispute settlement provisions 
 
With very minor textual differences (in "boilerplate" fashion), the settlement of disputes 
between the EC and all its partners to Euro-Mediterranean Agreements86 and European 
Partnership Agreements (now mostly superseded by accession),87 is (or, pre-accession, was) 
governed by the same provision, worth reproducing in full:88 
1. Each of the Parties may refer to the Association Council any dispute 
relating to the application or interpretation of this Agreement. 
 
84 See Lopez supra note 69, 200-202.  
85 See supra section II.  
86 Algeria, Egypt, Tunisia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco and the Palestinian Authority. 
87 In all, ten European Partnership Agreements were signed by the EC, with Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia (for a table listing dates of signature and entry into force, see 
online, Commission of the European Communities, http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/pas/europe_agr.htm. Of these 
countries, only Romania and Bulgaria have yet to accede to the EU. Malta and Cyprus did not have pre-accession European 
Partnership Agreements. Croatia whose candidacy for accession was approved on 18 June, 2004, has signed a Stability and 
Association Agreement with the EC (see COM(2001) 371 final, Brussels, 9 July, 2001) and currently has in force an Interim 
Agreement with it (O.J. L330 1,  14.12.2001). In both Croatia's agreements, disputes are to be settled through consultation 
only.       
88 Here taken from Article 75 of the Israel-EC Association Agreement (supra note 53). For a convenient comparative table of 
the provisions of all Euro-Mediterranean Agreements, see I. de Prada Leal and J. Deka, Euro-Med Association Agreements: 
Implementation Guide, 30 July, 2004, available online: Commission of the European Communities, 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/euromed/asso_agree_guide_en.pdf.
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2. The Association Council may settle the dispute by means of a decision. 
 
3. Each Party shall be bound to take the measures involved in carrying out 
the decision referred to in paragraph 2. 
 
4. In the event of it not being possible to settle the dispute in accordance 
with paragraph 2, either Party may notify the other of the appointment of 
an arbitrator; the other Party must then appoint a second arbitrator within 
two months. For the application of this procedure, the Community and the 
Member States shall be deemed to be one Party to the dispute. 
 
The Association Council shall appoint a third arbitrator. 
 
The arbitrators' decisions shall be taken by majority vote. 
 
Each party to the dispute must take the steps required to implement the 
decision of the arbitrators. 
 
How does this procedure measure up to the parameters of pro-Pax Mercatoria RTA dispute 
settlement? 
 
(ii) Effectiveness 
 
The differences between this procedure and the NAFTA procedures just discussed are glaring. 
As far as effectiveness is concerned, there is no delimitation of the allowed duration of a 
dispute, neither in the Association Council negotiation stage, nor in the arbitration stage. In 
fact, the absence of concrete timeframes is just one aspect of the weak and ineffective character 
of this procedure. The entire concept of settling a dispute at the Association Council level is a 
case of faux institutionalization – the Association Council is a ministerial-level body, designed 
to meet but once a year,89 hardly a forum for effective dispute settlement. According to typical 
Association Council Rules of Procedure, special sessions may be held only if both parties 
agree.90 This is in contrast to the only facially similar stage of Free Trade Commission review 
under article 2007.1 NAFTA, in which the Commission must convene within 10 days of the 
request, unless it decides otherwise (article 2007.4). Clearly, in these EC RTAs, disputes that 
arise will normally be delegated to the official-level Association Committee,91 and essentially 
managed and negotiated in regular day-to-day diplomatic relations, even if they will ultimately 
require an Association Council Decision to be formally settled amicably. In these 
circumstances, without time limits, there is no knowing how long a dispute will take until 
resolution, even if formally referred to the Association Council.  
 
Furthermore, the Association Agreement procedures have no effective method of 
enforcement, relying on the parties' respect for the results of an Association Council Decision 
or arbitration award. Dispute settlement is thus not only potentially lengthy and of uncertain 
duration, but also potentially indeterminate, because a party may choose not to comply, or to 
 
89 See, e.g., article 67 of the EC-Israel Association Agreement. 
90 See Article 2 of the Rules of Procedure of the EC-Israel Association Council, in COM(2000) 337 final, 5 May, 2000. Under 
the same Article, the Association Council is essentially required to meet on EU territory ("at the usual venue for meetings of 
the Council of the European Union") unless otherwise agreed by the parties. 
91 As permitted under Article 70(2) of the Israel-EC Association Agreement, for example. 
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comply and then renege, with the only remedy being one of political pressure – or recourse to 
the same ineffective procedure. 
 
(iii) Automaticity 
 
The issue of time limits naturally flows into the question of automaticity, which is entirely 
absent in this EC-RTA dispute settlement template, and one of the central contributors to its 
non-judicial character. In NAFTA, the test for moving from diplomatic negotiation to 
arbitration was an objective one: the passage of time from the initiation of consultations and 
Free Trade Committee talks (subject to the decision of the complaining party to request 
arbitration). In the EC RTA provision, the test is a subjective one: if it is not possible to settle 
the dispute through negotiation. The complaining party's decision that this test has been 
satisfied becomes in itself a politically charged statement, signaling a disruption of relations. 
The lack of automaticity thus has a political effect. The shift to more judicialized arbitration is 
not itself judicialized, but becomes a matter of negotiation and political ploys. As a result, as 
we have seen, arbitration under Association Agreements is essentially a dead letter. 
 
In addition, the responding party has several opportunities to block the arbitral process. 
It can drag negotiations on indefinitely. Once the complaining party has taken the plunge and 
appointed an arbitrator, the responding party may combine political disdain with the claim that 
it is still premature to declare that the dispute cannot be resolved diplomatically, and so refuse 
to appoint its own arbitrator, in spite of the two month time frame.92 It need not do that 
however in order to scuttle the process, because the third party is to be appointed by the 
Association Council – recall its lax Rules of Procedure – and so the third arbitrator must be 
agreed upon by both parties, granting the respondent an effective veto for appointment. There 
is no recourse to appointment of the third arbitrator by a third party;93 and so the appointment 
of an arbitration panel can also take an unforeseeable period of time, to the point of being 
blocked entirely. Of course, this kind of conduct should be considered to be in bad faith, but 
the possibility of it occurring, and the political acrimony that would come with it, make the 
resort to arbitration distinctly unattractive. 
 
(iv) Juridical interface 
 
The choice of forum - between dispute settlement under the Euro-Mediterranean and European 
Partnership Association Agreements and the WTO is not regulated by the Association 
Agreements themselves. There are two interpretative alternatives for this default.  
 
First, the silence of the agreements could be said to be permissive. Absent an 'exclusive 
jurisdiction' clause, parties are free to disregard Association Agreement provisions and to take 
disputes that may be governed by both legal systems to the WTO. This alternative is 
problematic from a few respects. The complaining party, by opting for the WTO, will be 
waiving the ability to make a claim there on the basis of RTA provisions. RTA provisions in 
 
92 See paragraph 4 of the model dispute settlement provision, supra.
93 In the WTO, if parties to a dispute cannot agree on the composition of a panel (as proposed by the Secretariat) within 20 
days, the panel will be appointed (at the request of a party) by the WTO Director-General, in consultation with the Chairman 
of the Dispute Settlement Body and the Chairman of the relevant Council or Committee, subject to the considerations 
enumerated in article 8.7 DSU. In NAFTA Chapter 20, if a party fails to appoint two panelists of the other party's citizenship, 
and/or the parties cannot agree on the identity of the panel chair, within 15 days, selection of these will be by lot (article 2011.1 
NAFTA; this arrangement applies, mutatis mutandis, in the case of a dispute involving more than two NAFTA parties (article 
2011.2)). 
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the WTO may, in certain circumstances, be the basis for a respondent's defense,94 but clearly 
cannot be the basis for a legal claim.95 
Indeed, the same could have been said of the NAFTA/WTO interface, but there, as we 
have already seen, the choice is between two judicialized systems, to be based on a nuanced 
cost-benefit analysis. In the EC RTAs discussed here, the option is between judicialized WTO 
dispute settlement based on WTO-only obligations, on one hand, and non-judicialized (by 
virtue, at least, of non-automaticity) negotiation involving RTA preferences. Add to this that as 
the factual record shows, all Association Agreement partners have proven to be WTO dispute-
averse,96 the choice is essentially non-existent.  
 
Furthermore, if the bilateral environment discourages shifting to arbitral proceedings in 
the RTA context, by excluding it from the natural course of RTA relations and turning it into a 
disruptive exception, resorting to WTO proceedings is a fortiori problematic in bilateral 
relations based on this kind of dispute settlement provision: not only do they disturb the 
diplomatic culture of the RTA itself, but they set aside its framework entirely, in favour of an 
external legal arrangement. 
 
Second, in the alternative, it might be argued that according to general rules of 
interpretation of international law – lex posterior derogat priori97 and lex specialis derogate 
generali,98 at least in the cases where the EC RTA was concluded at a date later to either the 
entry into force of the WTO Agreements, or to the date of WTO accession of the EC RTA 
partner, the RTA dispute provisions prevail over the WTO system, including Article 23.1 DSU, 
inasmuch as this provision might be interpreted as, at the time of the WTO Agreements, 
directing WTO parties to use the WTO system to the exclusion of others. Now, it is entirely 
unnecessary in the present context to debate the validity of this argument. Where the previous 
interpretative alternative would merely make recourse to WTO dispute settlement seriously 
'uncomfortable' for the complainant, this interpretation would make it legally impossible, or at 
least, a violation of the RTA.  
 
Regarding the second aspect of juridical interface – application and choice of laws - EC 
Association Agreements with WTO Members typically make extensive reference to the 
application of WTO rules.99 In the context of the choice of forum just described, this may have 
the effect of strengthening the legal and political arguments whereby RTA disputes ought to be 
 
94 Such a defense may be successful between RTA partners, but is problematic when third parties are involved, in light of the 
requirements of article XXIV GATT, and as Turkey found in WT/DS234/AB/R Turkey - Restrictions on Imports of Textile and 
Clothing Products (Appellate Body Report), 22 October, 1999.. 
95 This appears to be the proper interpretation of the WTO DSU, which applies to disputes under the WTO covered agreements 
(article 1.1); it serves to "preserve the rights and obligations of Members under the covered agreements" (article 3.1); standard 
panel terms of reference require the panel to examine the matter referred to it in light of the covered agreements. Arguably, 
none of this should preclude a panel from considering the rights and obligations of the parties under other agreements to which 
they are both parties, but there is a considerable gap between this argument, and allowing the WTO dispute settlement to 
accept claims not based ont eh WTO agreements themselves. 
96 See section II supra.
97 The rule later in time derogates from the earlier one. See Article 30, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for 
signature 23 May 1969, entered into force 27 January, 1980, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (VCLT). On the question of whether this rule 
at all applies to the WTO Agreements, and an argument whereby the WTO should be viewed as un-dateable ongoing 
obligations to which the lex posterior does not apply, see J. Pauwelyn, "The Nature of WTO Obligations", Jean Monnet 
Working Paper No. 1/02, available online, Jean Monnet Program, 
http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/02/020101.html.
98 The specific rule derogates from the general one. In this case, the sense referred to is that regulated by Article 41 VCLT, 
wherein parties to a multilateral convention may modify the terms of the treaty as apply between them by separate agreement, 
subject to the conditions of Article 41 VCLT. 
99 E.g., fifth preambular paragraph, Articles 6, 22, 26 and 29 of the EC-Israel Association Agreement.  
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settled within the RTA (because there is ostensibly no loss of rights in the RTA) – again 
agitating for political rather than judicial procedures.100 
(v)  Euro-Med and European Partnership Agreements and Pax Mercatoria:
Conclusions 
 
The degree to which the dispute settlement provisions of the Euro-Mediterranean and 
European Partnership Association Agreements stray from the requisites of the Pax Mercatoria 
is striking. They lack the effectiveness required to shorten the duration and reduce the intensity 
and salience of trade disputes, and to increase the durability of dispute settlement findings. By 
de-automaticizing the shift from consultations to arbitration, they actually suppress judicialized 
dispute settlement between parties to the RTA, either in the RTA itself or in the WTO, 
encouraging the retaining of the dispute in diplomatic negotiations. The option of resorting to 
WTO procedures is not regulated expressly, resulting in legal uncertainty that deters from 
taking such action, for political reasons. All the de-linkage effects of judicialized dispute 
settlement are thus passed over.  
 
This is consistent with the factual record presented in section III supra – EC RTA 
partner disputes remain in the non-transparent, non-judicial sphere of RTA political relations. 
In a sense, it might contrarily be argued that the non-transparency of RTA disputes act as a 
counterweight to the negative effects of non-judicialization, making disputes less visible and 
hence less damaging to political relations, but this ignores the fact that the economic actors 
most severely affected by the dispute, and hence most likely to exert influence and contribute 
to the politicization of the dispute, are privy to the dispute's details, even if the general public is 
not. 
 
In sum, the dispute settlement provisions of EC Association Agreements – notably, 
those RTAs with partners in the ECs immediate geographical region – run counter to the logic 
of Pax Mercatoria.101 This does not exhaust the discussion of the law and practice of the EC's 
RTAs, however; it is quite dissimilar when geopolitically distinct and qualitatively different 
partners are involved. 
 
(d) SACU, Mexico and Chile 
 
Three relatively recent EC RTAs have, to varying degrees, broken the mold of dispute 
settlement set in the Euro-Mediterranean and European Partnership Association Agreements: 
the EC-Mexico Global Agreement;102 the EC-Chile Association Agreement;103 and the Trade, 
Development and Cooperation Agreement (TDCA) between the EC and the South African 
 
100 To be sure, the express reference to certain WTO disciplines creates a degree of uncertainty regarding the extent of 
application of WTO rules not so expressly referred to in or incorporated by the RTA – either expressio unius est exclusion 
alterius (the expression of one is to the exclusion of others) or ex abundante cautela (reference out of excessive caution) may 
apply. 
101 A footnote to this conclusion, and in essence to the entire paper. The non-conformity of the dispute settlement provisions of 
these agreements with the Pax Mercatoria model does not bear upon the Pax Mercatoria design and effect of the substance of 
the Association Agreements in general. In other words, the economic interdependence enhanced by the agreements may serve 
the purpose of promoting peaceful and stable relations, but the dispute settlement provisions do not contribute to this, 
becoming a counterproductive element of the whole, and, as will be explained in the concluding section infra, possibly charged 
with a Pax Europea purpose, if not effect. 
102 See supra note 50. 
103 See supra note 50. 
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Customs Union (SACU).104 All three demonstrate higher levels of effectiveness and 
judicialization, more in line with the Pax Mercatoria model. 
 
In the TDCA, a distinction has been drawn between non-trade subjects covered by the 
agreement, provided for in Titles IV-VIII TDCA (such as development, financial issues and 
other areas of cooperation), and trade disputes. In the case of a dispute related to the former, 
the Euro-Mediterranean/European Partnership template of dispute settlement is generally 
followed, except for the addition of time limits: the third arbitrator must be appointed by the 
Cooperation Council (substantially equivalent to the Association Council in Euro-
Mediterranean Agreements) within 6 months of the appointment of the second, respondent-
appointed arbitrator (Article 104.5 TDCA). The Arbitral decision must be taken "within 12 
months", presumably of the appointment of the third arbitrator (Article 104.6). This is a step 
towards effectiveness and automaticity – but a small one, as there is no procedure that applies 
if the respondent party does not appoint the second arbitrator on time, or delays the agreement 
on the identity of the third arbitrator by the Cooperation Council. Timeframes are extended, 
enabling the judicial process to commence while allowing considerable space for negotiations 
– an important element given the non-trade subject matter. 
 
In the case of trade or trade-related disputes, on issues governed by Title II-III TDCA, 
timeframes are considerably shorter (Article 104.9). The second arbitrator must be appointed 
within 30 days, the third within an additional 60 days. The arbitral decision must be rendered 
within six months of appointment, or within three months, in cases of urgency. A procedure for 
preventing blockage or simple procrastination by the respondent is, however, absent, as in the 
Euro-Mediterranean/European Partnership Association Agreements. There are also timeframes 
for compliance, similar to those of the WTO DSU:105 60 days for the respondent to inform of 
its intentions with respect to implementation (Article 104.9(d) TDCA) and a "reasonable 
period" for implementation that shall not exceed 15 months (Article 104.9(e) TDCA); but 
again, there is no provision for dealing with non-compliance with these time limits. 
 
Article 104.10 TDCA addresses the juridical interface with the WTO in an unusual way, 
attempting to disconnect the regional from the multilateral. Rights to have recourse to the 
WTO DSU are preserved, but the parties "endeavour" to settle trade and trade-related disputes 
relating to Titles II-III TDCA using the TDCA's dispute settlement procedure. Furthermore, on 
any issue, arbitral panels established under the TDCA will not address WTO rights and 
obligations. The upshot of this provision is to try to construct the TDCA dispute settlement as 
separate from and operatively parallel to the WTO DSU, implying that disputes, even if settled 
judicially, should be kept within RTA bounds. Nevertheless, it appears that disputes relating to 
the same issue can therefore be brought by an interested party in both the WTO and TDCA; the 
WTO panel will apply only WTO rules; the TDCA panel will apply only TDCA rules. 
Whether this bifurcation or compartmentalization can be applied in practice, and if so, whether 
it is efficient, remains to be seen. What is interesting in our context is that the regulation of 
choice of forum is itself legalized through specific rules, whose  effect is to broaden rather than 
to restrict the range of judicial procedures accessible to the parties. 
 
The EC-SACU TDCA is thus formally close to the Euro-Mediterranean/European 
Partnership formula, and leaves much to be desired as far as the effectiveness of time limits is 
concerned, but in substance, it promotes effectiveness and automaticity, treating judicialized 
 
104 Agreement on Trade, Development and Cooperation between the European Community and its Member States, of the one 
part, and the Republic of South Africa, of the other part, O.J. L 311 , 4 December, 1999, pp. 3-297. 
105 Article 21 DSU. 
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dispute settlement as an inevitable, normal part of bilateral relations; it also adopts a special 
pro-judicialized juridical interface with the WTO. It is prima facie in conformity with the Pax 
Mercatoria model. 
 
Where the TDCA somewhat timidly progresses towards effective and judicialized RTA 
dispute resolution, the EC-Mexico Global Agreement and the EC-Chile Association 
Agreement contain some of the most judicialized RTA dispute settlement provisions in 
existence today, representing a mixture of NAFTA, WTO and entirely original provisions. 
Their intricacy cannot be done justice in this brief survey, and we will mention only those 
provisions that are relevant to the resent discussion. The Global Agreement procedures, set out 
in a Joint Council Decision,106 are themselves detailed enough, but include additionally 
elaborated Model Rules of Procedure (MRP)107 for panels, as well as a Code of Conduct108 
regulating panelist qualifications and obligations. At the consultations stage, the responsible 
forum is the Joint Committee,109 a body composed of senior officials rather than ministers; at a 
party's request it must meet within 30 days. Timeframes are strict at all stages of the process,110 
and include alternatives to prevent blocking – for example, after the complaining party 
proposes the first arbitrator, and three candidates for the panel chair, the respondent must 
propose a second arbitrator and its own three candidates for panel chair, within 15 days 
(Article 44(1) Joint Council Decision). If there is no agreement on the panel chair within an 
additional 15 days, the chair is selected by lot from among the six candidates (Art 44(4) Joint 
Council Decision). In these provisions the Global Agreement has adopted some of the 
NAFTA's insights.  
 
This is not all: the Global Agreement also includes strict procedures and timelines for the 
completion of the panel process and the implementation of its findings, including the 
possibility of arbitral proceedings on the reasonable time for compliance, on the subsequent 
measures taken to comply, or on the proportionality of suspended concessions to the loss 
caused by the other party (Article 46 Joint Council Decision). In these provisions the Global 
Agreement mimics the WTO DSU. 
 
The process under the Global Agreement is therefore far more effective and automatic 
than in the EC RTAs discussed so far. As for juridical interface, the Global Agreement adopts 
what may be called a 'bright line approach', separating between WTO and RTA procedures in a 
more advanced way than in the EC-SACU TDCA. First, under Article 41(2) Joint Council 
Decision, certain trade issues are entirely excluded from the coverage of the Global Agreement 
arbitration procedures. This means that they can be subjected to consultation (including the 
requirement to convene the Joint Committee within 30 days), but if these are unsuccessful, 
litigation in these excluded subjects will need to be held in the WTO. The excluded subjects 
are mainly issues in which the Joint Committee Decision taken under the Global Agreement 
simply incorporates and reaffirms WTO commitments: antidumping and countervailing duties 
 
106 Title VI of Decision No. 2/2000 of the EC-Mexico Joint Council of 23 March, 2000, O.J. L 157/10-28, 30 June, 2000 (the 
Joint Council Decision). 
107 Annex XVI to Decision No. 2/2000 of the EC-Mexico Joint Council, 23 March, 2000, available online, Commission of the 
European Communities, http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/trade/issues/bilateral/countries/mexico/docs/en2_annex_16.pdf.
108 Appendix I, ibid..
109 See Article 42(2) of the Joint Council Decision. The EC-Mexico Joint Committee established under Article 48 of the Global 
Agreement is substantially equivalent to Association Committees in the Euro-Mediterranean/European Partnership Association 
Agreements. 
110 Under the Joint Council Decision, an arbitration panel can be requested within 15 days of commencement of consultations 
or 45 days of the request for consultations (preventing delay in case the Joint Committee does not convene in a timely manner) 
(Article 43(1); arbitrator and chair selection is to be completed within a further 30 days (Article 44); and a final arbitration 
panel report should be presented within four to six months of the panel's appointment (Article 45). 
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(Article 14), technical barriers to trade (Article 19(2)); sanitary and phytosanitary measures 
(Article 20(1)); and balance of payment difficulties (Article 21); but also areas in which 
arbitration may not be fruitful, such as RTAs with other parties (Article 23); and the activity of 
the special council on intellectual property (Article 40). 
 
Second, as in the TDCA, the Global Agreement Joint Decision arbitration procedures 
are not permitted to consider issues relating to the party's rights and obligations under the 
WTO Agreements (Article 47(3)). This may raise questions of efficiency – forcing litigation in 
two fora instead of one, but this is a premature concern, because of the next, third and final 
element of importance. Article 47(4) of the Joint Decision sets out rules of choice and priority 
of forum. While arbitration under the Global Agreement is without prejudice to WTO dispute 
settlement (and as we have seen, the exclusion of certain trade subjects and separation of WTO 
rights and obligations mandates this), Global Agreement arbitration and WTO panel 
procedures (but not consultations) on the "same matter" cannot be held simultaneously, but 
rather serially, with the complaining party determining the order of preference. The combined 
effect of these juridical interface provisions is that when a trade dispute involves a mixture of 
RTA and WTO rights and obligations, and/or a mixture of issues covered by RTA arbitration 
and issues excluded therefrom, the RTA claims on covered issues will be litigated separately - 
and consecutively - from the WTO claims on excluded issues. If the complainant is successful 
in one forum on one legal basis, it may not feel compelled to continue to the other forum to 
pursue its additional claims, thus preserving efficiency without deterring necessary 
litigation.111 
This juridical interface accepts judicial dispute settlement as an inseparable part of 
bilateral RTA relations. This is not surprising – as already noted, Mexico is very active in 
dispute settlement in both the NAFTA and the WTO. It is therefore also not surprising that the 
only case to date of the EC initiating a WTO dispute against an RTA partner – Mexico – Olives 
– is against Mexico. The taboo of judicial dispute settlement that is encouraged by the design 
of most EC Association Agreements does not exist in the Global Agreement (and indeed, 
could, most likely, not be accepted by Mexico). The reason that Mexico – Olives was initiated 
in the WTO and not in the RTA is also clear now; it relates to countervailing duties, which are 
one of trade issues excluded from the coverage of Global Agreement arbitration under Article 
41 of the Joint Decision. 
 
In sum, the Global Agreement procedures, in their effectiveness, automaticity and 
express legalized regulation of juridical interface, are distinctly pro-Pax Mercatoria.
Much the same could be said of the EC-Chile Association Agreement dispute 
settlement procedures.112 Without surveying all the details of these procedures, suffice it to 
mention that they also include strict time limits, some of which are even shorter than those 
applicable in trade and trade-related disputes under the Global Agreement;113 that there are 
additional mechanisms to prevent delay and blocking, including a pre-selected roster of 
panelists114 and a detailed implementation procedure;115 and several innovative elements of 
 
111 One possible problem in the application of the Article 47(4) system of separate, serial litigation, is that the prohibition on 
initiating two parallel procedures on the same matter applies only to the same party. There appears to be no impediment upon 
the other party, i.e., a respondent in a case brought to Global Agreement arbitration is not precluded from bringing a 
counterclaim on the same matter to WTO dispute settlement. 
112 Title VIII, Annex XV (Model Rules of Procedure) and Annex XVI (Code of Conduct). 
113 The three arbitrators serving on an arbitral panel are to be selected by lot from a pre-agreed roster, within only three days of 
the request for a panel (Article 185(3)).  
114 Article 185(2). 
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judicialization such as the possibility of holding public hearings,116 and the regulation of 
amicus curiae brief submission.117 All of these serve to make the EC-Chile procedures highly 
effective, automatic and judicialized overall. 
 
The juridical interface of the EC-Chile Association Agreement with the WTO is 
regulated in Article 189, presenting a different approach to separation of proceedings, bearing 
some similarity to Chapter 20 NAFTA. Claims under the WTO will be brought to the WTO; 
claims under the Association Agreement will be brought under the Association Agreement. 
This may be taken to define the application of law as well, with each system of law applying 
only in its system of dispute settlement, but this is not stated expressly. In the case of claims 
relating to obligations under both agreements that are substantially similar to each other, the 
default forum is the WTO, unless otherwise agreed by the parties. Once a procedure has been 
selected, it becomes the exclusive forum on that matter.  
 
As in NAFTA and the Global Agreement, arbitration in the EC-Chile Agreement is not 
regarded as an irregular occurrence, but rather as a normal part of bilateral relations, whose 
mechanisms must be regulated in advance. Effectiveness, automaticity, judicialization, and 
well-defined juridical interface are all included, conforming to the Pax Mercatoria model.   
 
Our findings in this section make it clear that not all RTA dispute settlement procedures 
were created equal in their propensity to support the Pax Mercatoria rationale of RTAs. More 
specifically, we have found a distinct contrast between the Pax Mercatoria parameters  - 
effectiveness, automaticity and legalized juridical interface – of the NAFTA and the minority 
of the EC's RTAs (its 'extra-regional' agreements, with Mexico, Chile, and to some extent, 
SACU), on the one hand, and those of the EC's properly 'regional' RTAs (the Euro-
Mediterranean agreements and (insofar as these are still exist and are relevant at the time of 
writing) the European Partnership Association Agreements. There is therefore a correlation 
between the geopolitical context of EC RTAs and the character of their dispute settlement 
procedures. In addition, there is an evident correlation between the WTO dispute-averseness of 
EC RTA-partners (as demonstrated in section III supra) and the judicial-ness (and hence, the 
Pax Mercatoria character) of EC RTA dispute settlement procedures. Of course, correlation 
does not necessarily prove causation, and the causal relationships between these findings are 
prone to either puzzlement or premature conclusions (although perhaps worthy of further 
thinking and research). Moreover, their cumulative impression is indisputable. The EC's 
'regional' RTA partners are well within the EC's sphere of political and economic influence; do 
not use the WTO's judicial system for the settlement of trade disputes; and do not have the real 
option of recourse to judicial dispute settlement procedures in their bilateral relations with the 
EC. 
 
V. Summary and Conclusions: Three Paradoxes and the Need for Reform  
 
It is now time to summarize and integrate this paper's findings, on its three levels: Theoretical, 
empirical and legal. On the theoretical level, our discussion of Pax Mercatoria theory, while 
not ignoring its deficiencies, found that the design of trade dispute settlement procedures can 
contribute to the reduction of political friction between RTA parties, if they satisfy certain 
conditions; namely, these procedures must be effective and tend towards judicialization. This 
 
115 Article 188. 
116 Article 23, Model Rules of Procedure.
117 Article 35, Model Rules of Procedure.
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judicialization should be expressed in the automaticity of proceedings and, in the RTA/WTO 
context, in the legalization of the RTA/WTO juridical interface. If not, the central advantages 
of reduction of dispute salience, decoupling from political fora and de-linkage from political 
disagreements will be lost, and the positive effect of trade dispute settlement on the reduction 
of political friction will be diminished.  
 
On the factual level, we found that the EC's RTA partner's within its proper geopolitical 
vicinity are WTO dispute-averse, in general, but also that the EC has never taken any of these 
partners to WTO dispute settlement. EC-RTA disputes thus remain in the low-visibility domain 
of RTA dispute settlement. This tendency towards RTA dispute settlement is either due to an 
extraordinarily high degree of effectiveness or to a non-judicial pulling effect that keeps 
disputes 'under wraps'. 
 
The legal analysis confirms the second hypothesis. The dispute settlement procedures 
of the EC's 'regional' RTAs are deficient in all Pax Mercatoria parameters, in contrast to those 
of the NAFTA and the EC's 'extra-regional' RTAs (with Mexico and Chile, certainly, but also 
with the SACU). The WTO dispute-averse regional partners have no real recourse to RTA 
judicialized dispute settlement. The entire concept of effective and impartial third-party dispute 
settlement is discouraged by the perpetuation of political pressures in the non-automatic, non-
legalized process of most EC RTAs. Indeed, as we have seen, in the 'regional' EC RTA's, 
recourse to judicialized dispute settlement is regarded as irregular and disruptive, as if not a 
natural part of ongoing trade relations, as if increased liberalization does not, in fact, bring an 
augmentation of trade disputes. 
 
There is therefore good reason to argue that most EC RTA dispute settlement 
provisions – particularly in those RTAs with the EC's properly 'regional' partners – are not 
consistent with the theoretical requirements of a Pax Mercatoria model, and do not themselves 
serve the idea of 'peace through trade'.  
 
This is only one side of the coin, however. The non-judicial character of EC RTA 
dispute settlement necessarily emphasizes the political asymmetry between the EC and its 
partners. This could easily be shown in terns of trade volumes and so on, but that would be 
belabouring an obvious point. If not judicialized, in trade dispute settlement there is a high 
degree of linkage between trade issues, other economic interests and political dialogue. In all 
of these arenas the EC has an absolute advantage in relation to its trading partners. Of what 
importance is a sectoral trade dispute, when one's participation in the EU's Sixth Framework 
Programme for research and development might be on the line? Or support, of even a passive 
nature, in the United Nations? If not legalized, in form and culture, turning to bilateral 
arbitration or to the WTO dispute settlement system by a partner may run the risk of offending 
the EC, with the permanent fear of political or economic countermeasures, of an 
unquantifiable, perhaps even intangible nature. Where in NAFTA the complaining party may 
choose between competing judicial systems, in the EC RTA context the decision to litigate is 
equivalent to crossing the Rubicon between "amicable", intra-RTA political negotiation and 
"hostile" RTA or extra-RTA third-party litigation. The unknown costs maintain European 
interests, to the point of a kind of regional hegemony. 
 
There is nothing necessarily 'wrong' in this situation. Pax Europea may be better than 
no Pax at all. A problem is that this order has little chance of surviving. This may be because 
of the EU's limited span of influence, beyond the form of economic pressure. Not least, 
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however, this is because of three paradoxes that present themselves in the Pax Europea model 
of RTA dispute settlement: 
 
First, there is an inherent conflict between a hegemonic/asymmetric element such as the 
form of non-judicial dispute settlement discussed here, and a system otherwise aimed at Pax 
Mercatoria.
Second, there is an internal inconsistency between the objectives of the ENP and 
Cotonou projects, that include the promotion of the regional and global rule of law, and a 
system of dispute settlement that stresses political power over rule-based compliance. 
 
Third, insofar as the ENP and EU foreign policy in general presumes to present a 
'softer' substitute to post-modern, power-based US 'empire', especially in the middle east, in 
this form of dispute settlement the EU presents itself as a 'poor man's' hegemon, rather than as 
a real paradigmatic alternative. 
 
In short, it is in the best interest of the EC's own initiatives to reform the dispute 
settlement procedures in its regional trade agreements, to bring them more in line with its 
strategic statements. As for the EC's partner's, present and future, this analysis may serve as a 
clarion call for improved, judicialized dispute settlement in RTAs; but ultimately it is up to 
each partner to weigh the balance between Pax Mercatoria and the degree of Pax Europea that 
it is willing to accept in its relations with the EU.   
